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1.1 Introduction 
 
 
I am presenting my motivation for writing an article on the that-clause in this introduction.  
In the article “Knowing How” Timothy Williamson and Jason Stanley mention an account by 
William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen that takes ‘knows how’ as a syntactic unit in an 
account of the syntactic structure of sentences. They maintain that it is ‘knowing that’ and 
‘know how’ that demand complementation, respectively by propositions and infinitive terms 
specifying an activity (e.g. ‘to ride). Williamson and Stanley claim however that the account 
presented by Bechtel and Abrahamsen conflicts with what is said about structure in resent 
syntactic theory. Williamson and Stanley describe the account made by Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen:  
 
One this view, in sentences such as (Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle), ‘knows how’ 
forms a constitution, which takes as a complement the expression ‘to ride a bicycle’, 
which is a description of an action. ‘Know’ has no clausal complement in (Hannah 
knows how to ride a bicycle). In (Hannah knows that penguins waddle), on the other 
hand, ‘that penguins waddle’ is the causal complement of ‘knows’, and denotes a 
proposition, which is the object of the knowledge relation. Such accounts of the 
syntactic structure of sentences like (Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle), however, are 
inconsistent with what is said about such structures in recent syntactic theory. (Stanley 
Williamson 417)  
 
Williamson and Stanley claim that according to recent syntactic theory in these knowing-how 
sentences it is ‘know’ that is the attitude constitution and not ‘know how’ and that ‘know’ 
takes an embedded question as a complement. And the standard analysis shows that know-
how sentences are not at all like know-that sentences. Know-how sentences like ‘Hannah 
knows how to ride a bicycle’ are similar too and have syntactic counterparts in for example 
‘Hannah knows [where to find a nickel]’, ‘Hannah knows [why to vote for Gore]’. These are 
sentences that have embedded questions as complementing ‘know’ and are similar to know-
how sentences. Williamson and Stanley mention that if know-how sentences are analysed like 
this, the complement clause can with a revised and developed version of Lauri Karttunens 
work on embedded questions be taken as denoting a set of true answers and this will be a set 
of propositional knowledge (Stanley Williamson 420). Williamson and Stanley’s main 
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argument in the article is that all knowledge is fundamentally propositional knowledge, and so 
this suggestion of treating these knowing-how sentences as containing embedded clauses like 
this is supporting their main claim. This is taken as supported by current syntactic analysis 
that claims that ‘know how’ sentences have embedded questions and that they contain 
untensed clauses. And according to Williamson and Stanley this makes ‘know how’ sentences 
primarily embedded question sentences like ‘Hannah knows [where to find a nickel]’ which 
has derivative propositional knowledge, and not typical propositional knowledge sentences 
like ‘John knows [that the house is red]. A typical knowledge-that sentence does not contain 
embedded questions and have tense clauses. Williamson and Stanley claim that one can also 
have embedded questions with tense clauses in different types of verb sentences that have a 
remarkable resemblance to these knowing-how sentences; ‘Hannah learned [how to ride a 
bicycle]’, Hannah asked [how to ride a bicycle]’, Hannah wonders [how to ride a bicycle]’. 
All this suggests that ‘know’ and ‘how’ do not form a syntactic unit that denotes a specific 
type of knowledge. According to current syntactic analysis ‘know’ takes an embedded 
question starting with a ‘how’ as its compliment. Williamson and Stanley conclude that there 
are no relevant differences between a typical ‘know how’ sentence and the other types of 
sentences containing a verb together with the term ‘how’ therefore: “This suggests that it is 
incorrect to take ‘know how’ as a constituent in sentences such as (2: Hannah knows how to 
ride a bicycle)” (Stanley Williamson 418).  
 
In the account made by Bechtel and Abrahamsen it is claimed that it is ‘know how’ that forms 
a syntactic constitution that takes a complement clause. The complement clause specifies an 
activity (e.g. ‘to ride’, ‘to jump’). The arguments presented by Williamson and Stanley 
concludes that to take ‘know how’ as a constituent is wrong in respect to current syntactic 
analysis. What Bechtel and Abrahamsen actually say in the section paraphrased is: “…the 
expression ‘knowing that’ requires completion by a proposition, whereas the expression 
‘knowing how’ is completed by an infinitive…” (Stanley Williamson 417). The apparent 
difference between the two claims made me interested in current syntactic analysis. They 
disagree on the parsing of knowing-how and knowing-that sentences. Williamson and Stanley 
claim that ‘know’ is the constituent that is complemented by either an embedded question or a 
that-clause (e.g. ‘that penguins waddle’) while Bechtel and Abrahamsen claim according to 
this forgoing paraphrase that ‘know that’ and ‘know how’ is the syntactic unit that takes a 
complement. This made me want to investigate the foundation for the syntactic parsing of 
sentences like this. I do not believe in any way that the parsing is the most interesting or 
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fundamental subject in philosophy but just when if comes to this debate the parsing is quite 
important.  
   
A point that is not explicit mentioned in the account by Williamson and Stanley but which 
interests me is whether it is likely or plausible to maintain that ‘know’ is the unit that takes a 
complement in knowing-that sentences and that ‘know how’ is the unit that takes a 
complement in knowing-how sentences. Is it implausible that they would be so grammatically 
different if the difference between them is simply that they denote different types of 
knowledge? From what Bechtel and Abrahamsen actually says they think that ‘know how’ 
and ‘know that’ is the terms referring to knowledge, but in Williamson and Stanley’s 
interpretation of what Bechtel and Abrahamsen said it’s claimed that: “On this view…‘knows 
how’ forms a constitution… on the other hand, ‘that penguins waddle’ is the clausal 
complement of ‘knows’, and denotes a proposition…” (Stanley Williamson 417).  That means 
that there is a grammatical difference between knowing-that sentences and knowing-how 
sentences can amount to a problem for the supporters of parsing ‘know how’ as a 
constitution.1 I think that the account of knowing-how sentences and knowing-that sentences 
that Williamson and Stanley present is plausible. I doubt that one should parse ‘knowledge 
how’ as a syntactic unit. That’s why instead of finding arguments for the parsing of sentences 
with ‘know how’ as a constitution I’ll attempt to find arguments denying that ‘knowledge’ 
takes that-clause as a complement. This because it seems as an interesting subject, and 
because the difference between Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s account and Williamson and 
Stanley’s account made me interested to find out what’s the real parsing and what foundation 
that supports it. I have problems accepting the that-clause as a valid singular term that refers 
to propositions. My goal in the paper is to weaken the claim of the standard syntactic analysis 
and thereby keeping the opportunity of treating ‘know how’ and ‘know that’ as syntactic 
constituents. I can not focus on all different levels related to this subject and so I will try to 
constrain the level of argumentation to parsing, grammatical structure and logical structure 
and evaluate on this level.  
 
When Williamson and Stanley talk about syntactic units and complements they talk about the 
units in linguistic expressions and their relation and roles in the expression. A constitution is 
as syntactic unit and a complement is the clause that follows. The syntactical units are 
                                                 
1
 David Carr is a philosopher that Williamson and Stanley mentions that maintain that ’know how’ is a 
constitution. He takes action descriptions as the complement of ‘know how’ (Stanley Williamson 416).  
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sometimes the same as tokens of the grammatical classes in the language. For example will a 
proper name (‘John’) often be a single syntactic unit that refers to John. A problem is that we 
as philosophers want to find “that which is universal” and the logical fundament included and 
supported by our claims and our sentences. But our data and tools are linguistic entities for 
example sentences, utterances, terms etc. and language as a whole is a specific system based 
on axioms with rules and with certain supposed abilities to connect to the world (like 
referring, denoting, expressing etc). It is possible to find different descriptions of the function 
or purpose of communicative signs all according to the system it is a part of, but we intend 
with them to reflect the world and not only the world but something in the world that is 
hopefully universal. Another thing that makes it trouble is that we have grammar and this as 
single claims and as a system do not pay much attention to the fundamental logic and 
universality of the world, but still when seeing it as a system it seeks to be coherent and 
descriptive and in that sense it probably has some aspects that correspond with fundamental 
logic as we suppose the world also to be coherent. However this does not mean that the 
coherence of grammar needs to reflect the coherence of the truths in the world, but it is 
constructed by language and hopefully language pays credit to something fundamental.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Specifications  
 
To begin the discussion of the that-clause; I will assume that there is a widespread consensus 
about ‘that’ belonging to the subordinate part of Propositional Attitude Ascriptions (Short 
PAA). The consensus is extensive but not all-embracing. There are a few philosophers who 
do not think that that-clauses are the self evident last part of all PAAs. Donald Davidson and 
Prior are philosophers that have presented theories that support a competing view and both 
present different reasons for why the ‘that’ belongs outside the subordinate clause in PAAs. 
One can also find people who in writing about attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports 
parse their examples with the term ‘that’ outside the subordinate-clause (see section 3.1.2, 
Edward N Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/). This might be just a unfortunate 
mistake but it does not lead to any real philosophical contradictions because those who do this 
still assume everything about this subordinate clause they would assume about the that-clause; 
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for example that it refer to propositions, that it is a singular term, that it denotes a proposition 
etc.2 The reason one can still assume all this is because there have not to my awareness been 
presented any arguments explaining actually how the term ‘that’ is contributing in the 
subordinate-clause of propositional attitude ascription thus making it a that-clause (that-clause 
e.g. a subordinate clause starting with a ‘that’ which is syntactically seen as a singular term 
that refers to or denotes propositions) and why a subordinate clause without a ‘that’ is not a 
singular term and can therefore not refer to or denote a proposition. To me the choice of the 
that-clause as the subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech 
reports seems arbitrary. This is a controversial claim but after having trouble finding 
arguments supporting the that-clause and with this explaining the contribution of the ‘that’ in 
the subordinate clause of propositional attitude ascriptions, the claim seems defensible. 
Gottlob Frege, the philosopher credited for first presenting a version of the that-clause, do not 
present any argument for why the ‘that’ makes the last syntactic unit of PAAs into a singular 
term that can refer to propositions and vice versa, but he does call the that clause an abstract 
noun phrase introduced by ‘that’ (Frege 66). 
 
The upshot is that when comparing arguments there is no difference between those who parse 
the that-clause with the ‘that’ outside the subordinate clause and those who parse it according 
to current standards with the ‘that’ inside.3 So the philosophers get the same conclusions in 
their respective substantial arguments regardless of where the ‘that’ is parsed and then it 
seems to me that if the ‘that’ is outside the subordinate clause it does not really have any 
impact on the arguments presented. It is however not right of me to assume this, for 
supposedly there are reasons supporting why ‘that’ needs to be a part of the subordinate 
clause of propositional attitude ascriptions. These are the reasons I want to look closer at. I 
will investigate arguments supporting that the term ‘that’ contributes something semantically 
or syntactically that is necessary for making the subordinate clause of propositional attitude 
ascriptions into a singular term and thereby making it refer to or in some other way denote 
propositions. It is perhaps not possible to leave the term ‘that’ out of the subordinate 
syntactical part of propositional attitude ascriptions, for the arguments supporting this might 
                                                 
2
 I do not mean to say that they explicit would claim that these subordinate clauses are singular terms, but they 
treat the subordinate clause without the ‘that’ if it was a singular term. Like when Bechtel and Abrahamsen say 
that “…the expression ‘knowing that’ requires completion by a proposition…” (Stanley Williamson 417).  
3
 What I suggest here is if what makes ‘that the earth is round’ a singular term referring to proposition is the 
mere stipulation of this, then one could also chose to take ‘the earth is round’ as the singular term referring to a 
proposition if one stipulated this. This entity would perhaps appear surface similar to a sentence (which is not to 
be taken as a singular term) but it would be different from a sentence by functioning differently.  
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be providing some foundation and conditions for other claims and arguments. This will be 
evaluated. The claim that the term ‘that’ is contributing semantically in that-clauses in 
propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports is something that is in need of 
argument, and I will try to find these arguments. I am also especially interested in finding and 
considering what is the foundation for the claim that a that-clause, that being the subordinate 
clause in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports which starts with the 
term ‘that’, is in fact a singular term. I will present theories that give alternative ways of 
parsing propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports and look closer at the 
reasons supporting the conflicting claims these present for why the term ‘that’ should not be a 
syntactic part of the subordinate clause. It is important for me to consider what kind of 
arguments exists that supports the that-clause. This is perhaps taken as an unimportant 
discrepancy in language philosophy but becomes important when considering the difference 
between knowledge-that and knowledge-how sentences, or at least for those who hold that 
‘know how’ forms a syntactic unit.4  
 
In the passing section I have mentioned some terms that need definition and clarification and 
some of this must come naturally when describing the theories. Among other things there will 
be an extensive explanation of the that-clause and propositional attitude ascription later and 
this will be presented mainly in connection to the consideration of the standard syntactic 
analysis and the relational theory. PAA is short for propositional attitude ascription and ISR is 
short for indirect speech reports and both are names of certain types of sentences. 
Propositional attitude ascription sentences describe a psychological attitude relation between a 
person and content. Here is an example; ‘John believes that Mary is having an affair’. In this 
case we have someone (John) who happens to have an attitude relation (believe) with 
something and this something is the content part that he believes (that Marry is having an 
affair). In indirect speech report sentences is it claimed that someone once said something. 
For example; ‘John said that the bear was large, ‘Jenny said that he was nice’.  
 
The subordinate clause in all types of sentences is stipulated as the last syntactic part. There is 
no unified agreement about what is the last syntactic part in propositional attitude ascriptions. 
It is possible to syntactically parse sentences the way one want but then one must have a 
theory to support this. There are options that would be implausible and one would need a 
                                                 
4
 David Carr 
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theory and arguments for the suggested parsing to be a plausible solution. I also believe there 
are ontological and metaphysical criteria that must be reckoned with when determining the 
syntactic parsing of sentences. Linguistic understood as a non-philosophical subject is perhaps 
not determined by ontological criteria but then parsing can become a part of a philosophical 
investigation and then the general ontological criteria and suppositions about language would 
be counted as relevant for the parsing of sentences. It is true that language as a system can be 
treated as independent from other considerations, and that this is common in non-
philosophical science, but given a philosophical outlook the core structure of language and the 
systems stand in a close relation to ontology and metaphysic.5  I mentioned that there was no 
agreement as to what was the last syntactic part of propositional attitude ascriptions; this is 
sort of supporting my writing about this topic because many supporters of propositionalism 
believe that that-clauses are in fact the subordinate clauses in all propositional attitude 
ascription sentences.6  But I am not convinced. I can not see that it is obviously true that ‘that’ 
is a part of the last syntactic unit of propositional attitude ascriptions and I have not been 
presented with any good arguments for this statement either. This is why I am writing this 
paper and looking into this subject. I will of course change my opinion on that-clauses if there 
are compelling arguments for it. In the preceding section I mentioned indirect reports and 
propositional attitude ascriptions as if they were interchangeable and the same thing. In fact 
they are different types of sentences, however, relevant to what I am discussing in this paper 
they are united in a single group. I can mention in advance; Donald Davidson deals with 
indirect report sentences and not attitude ascriptions. His arguments will still be relevant for 
attitude ascriptions because it is plausible to assume that what goes for the syntax of indirect 
reports also goes for the syntax of propositional attitude ascriptions.    
 
 
I will treat the standard syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions as my opponent 
in this paper. This is where Williamson and Stanley find support for their claims on parsing 
and syntax. There is another alternative and that is the relational theory. But I am using the 
standard syntactic analysis mainly because the standard analysis is supposed to be a neutral 
ground for this debate, even if it is difficult to assume that everyone agrees with the premises 
                                                 
5
 Among other things is the construction of terms as single units (ball car rock etc) correspondent with our 
general outlook on the ontology in the world; we see individual things, being of types of things, but primarily the 
focus is on single objects. Mass confined in a space that is independent from other masses confined in a space. 
Terms have the same structure and property in our sentences.  
6
 Some that believe this; Stephen Schiffer, Moltmann.  
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for this. There are many similarities between the claims of the relational theory and the 
standard syntactic analysis, so they are probably taken as the same by some philosophers.7 
The relational analysis is similar to the standard analysis, and it is what Moltmann calls 
“…the traditional view” (77).  I want to avoid claims that are difficult to prove but it seems 
like both the standard analysis and the relational analysis have features that must be 
characterised as initially plausible or pre-philosophically plausible regarding the logical 
structure of propositional attitude ascriptions.8 This makes them a natural place to start in any 
investigation. In the core of the relational theory is the claim that the predicate or verb in all 
propositional attitude ascriptions picks out an attitude that describes a relation between a 
person and a proposition and this is why it is called the relational analysis. In propositional 
attitude ascriptions examples like ‘John knows that the earth is round’ and ‘Jim loves that it 
snows in the winter’ the main focus is the predicate, which describes a relation between an 
agent and a proposition. When the relational analysis supposes that propositional attitude 
ascriptions describe a relation between agents and propositions then it seems that one can be a 
supporter of a relational analysis if one does not believe that there is an expression in PAAs 
that refers to propositions and that propositions exist. Both the relational analysis and the 
standard syntactic analysis entail structured-propositionalism. Structured-propositionalism 
says that what we in common sense terms call ‘the object of thought’ is mind and language 
independent propositions. This will be explained further at a later stage.  
 
In standard syntactic analysis one says that the predicate is a two-place relation predicate that 
stands between the name of a person, which refers to a person, and a that-clause which refers 
to a proposition. It is clear that the relational theory and the standard analysis are in effect 
saying the same thing. In my opinion there are two differences but these concerns the theories 
and not the substantial claims in the analysis. First the former is the standard analysis 
therefore it can be changed according to what is the current norm or presumptions about the 
syntax of propositional attitude ascriptions.9 This statement is perhaps somewhat a normative 
claim. I would hope that everyone would have a conception of a standard syntactic analysis as 
actually representing the standard. The use of the standard syntactic analysis in philosophy 
sometimes implies that it is a theory and not a changing account of the current assumptions. 
                                                 
7
 Their claims have the same implications and therefore do not pose a problem. 
8
 Davidson calls it a familiar structure (Davidson 96).  
9
  In other words, the relational analysis is a name of a theory, and the standard syntactic analysis is a function 
taking whatever is the standard syntax of sentences.  
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The optimal would be if everyone would treat the standard syntactic analysis as the combined 
claims of what is the current norm. Then the standard analysis is the name of the combined 
claims at present moment while the relational analysis would be a specific theory. It is useful 
to have theories too and not just collective assumptions representing the current norm. It is 
possible to change a theory while keeping the name also but this could create problems for 
sciences that compare ideas, theories and thoughts in history. I believe the best would be to 
keep the relational analysis as a theory that could be referred to, and if the supporters of the 
theory felt the theory needed extensive changes the result should be that one also changed the 
name of the theory.  
 
 
I find that the fact that one is a specific theory and the other describes roughly the current 
holding about parsing to be an important reason to prefer using the standard syntactic 
analysis. The second difference between the standard and the relational theory concerns there 
terminology. I prefer the standard syntactic analysis as it seems to have more specified claims 
and an explicit and definite terminology. In my experience the relational analysis is 
unfortunately apt for different understandings and interpretations of what the theory involves. 
This could be because it is stated quite vaguely and because its tools, that being the 
terminology in the analysis, is not as specific as in the standard analysis.  
 
What could be an example of this is that in describing the relational analysis Moltmann 
describes that-clauses as standing for a propositions that “…act as an argument of the 
predicate” (79). But what does it mean to say that that-clauses act as arguments of predicates? 
Moltmann is describing the relation between the predicate and propositions using a term with 
specific association and understandings. She is saying that that-clauses stand for propositions 
that act as arguments of predicates. But she is still using a description of a relation which is 
connecting to another context than those which the relational analysis pro-claimers will be 
content to agree with, and so the debate gets confused by the parties describing what takes 
place in different words with different connotations. However, I am not in a position to assert 
that describing being an argument of is a problematic and wrong property and description of a 
relation between predicates and propositions and therefore I cannot say that this is wrong. I 
prefer the standard syntactic analysis because it has a clear terminology and its constrictions 
of usable terms are constrained more severely than in the relational analysis. I hope my 
account and version of the standard syntactic analysis is accepted. This account is a skeleton 
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that can be a reference point when trying to make sense of the specific theories that deals with 
propositional attitude ascriptions or indirect speech reports. But first one must know what 
propositional attitude ascriptions are and what are the basis for this type of sentences and the 
historical problems associated with them. 
 
 
 
1.3 Propositional attitude ascriptions 
 
Propositional attitude ascription is a type of sentence that has received a lot of philosophical 
attention. Described straightforwardly one could say they are ascriptions one gives of a person 
that cite an attitude that person happens to have and that this attitude contains a propositional 
content. Some examples of propositional attitude ascriptions; Jane believes that roses are red, 
Henry knows that strawberries taste like this, Mona loves that it snows in the winter, Phil 
knows that doing the right thing is good and Bill believes that cats are mammals. The majority 
of these examples are unproblematic examples but some of them have problematic aspects 
that make them difficult for reasons not relevant for the subject in this paper. Since it is syntax 
and the logical form which interest me these don’t substitute a problem. As my arguments and 
claims are to be relevant for all types of propositional attitude sentences, in that respect the 
actual content of the sentences is irrelevant. Still, to avoid unnecessary complication non-
ethical examples will be focused on.  
 
 
If one considers the history of propositional attitude ascriptions it becomes apparent that it has 
been deemed an interesting class of sentence in philosophy for a long while. The philosopher 
Gottlob Frege is assumed to be the philosopher that introduced these sentences as a special 
problematic class. He showed a troublesome puzzle concerning propositional attitude 
ascriptions, he demonstrated that in these types of sentences the principle of identity 
substitution is not workable.10 The puzzle is one of conflicting assumptions; we suppose that 
it is viable to exchange names whenever they are referring to the same object (e.g. co-
referring names) and we expect this not to alter the truth value of the sentence. The problem is 
that we have intuition telling us that the conclusion from applying the substitution principle in 
                                                 
10
 To be correct he never explicitly mentioned propositional attitude ascriptions as a specific type of sentence. 
What he did mention was assertoric sentences that contain a thought (Frege 62). 
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attitude contexts is untrue. The upshot of this discrepancy between the applying of 
substitution principle in attitude contexts and the implausible conclusions makes it necessary 
to find the cause to this puzzle and resolve it. However one can not just dismiss the principle 
of substitution as it seems valid. The principle of identity substitution says that we can 
substitute co-referring names. That means that the principle says that if two terms refer or 
denote the same object then one can exchange terms without altering the truth value of the 
entire sentence, and this principle works in most contexts apart from attitude contexts. So it 
seems as the puzzle must be connected to something special in attitude contexts. In attitude 
contexts the truth value can change if one exchanges a proper name with another proper 
name, even if the proper names refer to the same individual. Some examples illustrating this 
will be presented. And the substitution principle applied to attitude contexts or propositional 
attitude ascriptions lead to what people would maintain are wrong conclusions. The 
substitution principle seems intuitively a true principle, but we have strong belief in our 
opinions about the attitudes of others and our selves. Some examples illustrating Frege’s 
puzzle:  
 
 
(1) Peter knows that the cat is on the mat 
(2) The cat is Rambo 
     (C) Peter knows that Rambo is on the mat 
 
 
(1) John knows that Mark Twain is his favourite author.  
(2) Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens 
(C) John knows that Samuel Clemens is his favourite author.  
 
 
In arguments like these the conclusions (C) seem to follow logically but they are in fact 
invalid. To take Peter as an example; he would probably not agree with this and consent that 
Rambo was on the mat, did he not already know that the cats name was Rambo. And in the 
case of John, he would not know that Samuel Clemens is his favourite author did he not know 
that Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens is the same person. Jon Barwise and John Perry when 
presenting innocent semantic in the article “ Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising 
Situations” claim that Frege’s puzzle about attitude ascriptions is created from considerations 
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assuming that a person cannot believe something X if that person would not agree to ‘It is true 
that X’ (Barwise Perry 397). This is then seen as the underlying criteria for claiming that the 
conclusions in these cases are wrong. John would not agree to ‘It is true that Samuel Clements 
is my favourite author’. If one were to accept an innocent semantic one could hold that it is 
true that Peter knows that Rambo is on the mat, because Peter sees the cat sitting on the mat 
and that is all that is needed for Peter to know that Rambo is on the mat. The fact that Peter 
would not assent to ‘Rambo is on the mat’ is indifferent. But accounts like these will not be 
considered, as I will assume that the puzzle about attitude ascriptions is genuine. The puzzle 
shows that in the context of attitudes like belief, knowledge, love, etc. it is impossible to 
exchange names of objects or persons even if they seemingly refer to the exact same object. 
This is a problem for we expect sentences to be true and we expect that they are stating 
something true about the world, and truth is not supposed to be context changeable. Then how 
is it possible that exchanging names which supposedly refers to the same object can lead to 
untrue conclusions? Frege introduced this and some other puzzles in language philosophy and 
the way these were resolved has influenced many philosophical theories and current views in 
standard syntactic analysis. Freges theory provided an answer to the puzzles and that was that 
names and descriptions have sense and that words or terms in attitude contexts do not refer to 
the objects they normally designate but to their normal sense. He introduced sense as a 
concept and this can explain problems regarding identity statements and attitude ascriptions in 
philosophy of language.11  
 
The new technical concept sense was according to him a second semantic notion besides 
reference or designating. He also presented other terms to described the relation: “A proper 
name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) express its sense and means or designate its 
meaning. “ (Frege 61). His last technical term in this paraphrase, meaning, is a different 
notion than our present notion of meaning. His concept of meaning is synonymous to object. 
Frege’s account features two fundamental semantic notions that functions in language. Terms 
can refer or denote an object; this was a familiar function before Frege. But he presents the 
function of expressing and that what is being expressed is sense and this was a novelty. His 
term sense stands for a semantic entity that is independent from reference or denotation, and 
according to Frege sense is “...a mode of presentation of the thing designated” (57). With this 
Frege introduced a new division between language and world thereby abolish innocent 
                                                 
11
 Frege 56  
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semantic. To visualize and explain his concept sense: it is thought of as an abstract entity or a 
concept or a cluster of content associated with objects. The term ‘sense’ is equivalent to what 
we would label ‘meaning’, ‘concept’ or as Frege called it ‘a mode of presentation’. This 
notion also explains the problem with identity statements; how it can be a novelty that two 
terms that refer to the same object are identical, and that terms that apparently contributes 
semantically in sentences still do not refer to an existing objects (Santa Clause, unicorn etc.). 
These terms can have sense without referring to actual existing objects. Frege meant that 
proper names and descriptions express senses in all contexts, not simply in attitude contexts. 
But there is something special happening in attitude contexts and that is the fact that what one 
expresses, that comes after the attitude in propositional attitude ascriptions, is a thought. He 
says:  
 
That in the case of the first kind the meaning of the subordinate clause is in fact the 
thought can also be recognized by seeing that it is indifferent to the truth of the whole 
whether the subordinate clause is true or false….The main clause and the subordinate 
clause together have as their sense only a single thought…  
(Frege 66-67). 
 
 
Frege meant the terms following the attitude term in propositional attitude ascriptions referred 
to their normal sense and only in an indirect fashion to their material objects.12 I would say 
that there is a context shift that happens in all propositional attitude ascriptions. The terms in 
the first part of propositional attitude contexts, for example ‘John believes’, refers in a regular 
and normal fashion. This is the normal context where truth value is determined by the objects 
and relations in the world corresponding with the description given. The last part of 
propositional attitude ascriptions on the other hand, for example ‘that snow is white’ are 
referring to objects of a different kind. In this context the referent of the words is a thought 
that can be true or false, but this semantic value will not matter in determining the truth value 
of the whole sentence. What is important is that John actually believes that snow is white, not 
that snow is white. And it seems as according to Freges account the way to verify and affirm 
that John thinks that snow is white is if he would assent to the claim: ‘It is true that snow is 
white’. According to the claims in the paraphrase it seems as Frege thinks that the whole 
                                                 
12
 If they have any.  
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sentence is a thought as he says that the main and the subordinate clause together have a 
single thought as their sense. But it is remarked by philosophers that Frege meant that names 
and descriptions refers to their sense as opposed to simply denotation in all sentences, but it is 
not maintained that every word in the language refers to their sense.  If the main clause and 
the subordinate clause together form a sense and a single thought, what prohibits every 
sentence in the language having a sense as a single thought? If the entire sentence ‘John 
believes that snow is white’ expresses a specific thought then how could I conclude from this 
that ‘John believes something’ if they express single thoughts? It would be like concluding B 
from A and this is not a logical conclusion. I cannot make sense of the claim that the main 
and the subordinate clause express a single thought. I will just ignore this and assume that he 
claims that what comes after the attitude predicate expresses a thought by having a definitive 
common sharable sense. This is Frege’s solution to why it is implausible to accept the 
conclusion when applying the substitution principle in propositional attitude ascriptions. To 
illustrate this; in the situation where the conclusion is that John knows that Samuel Clements 
is his favourite author, and this is a claim that John would not assent to. In this situation the 
thought ‘that Samuel Clements is my favourite author’ is not the same as ‘that Mark Twain is 
my favourite author’. Firstly, all proper names have sense so it is likely that ‘Samuel 
Clements’ don’t encompass the same sense as ‘Mark Twain’. Secondly, since terms inside the 
attitude contexts don’t refer to their ordinary objects because they refer to their sense, one can 
conclude that in all terms in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports 
including ‘Samuel Clements’ and ‘Mark Twain’ express different senses. The basis for 
applying the substitution principle was the assumption that these were co-referential but this 
turned out to be a wrong assumption. This explains the puzzle and it presents a solution. 
Frege’s introduction of another semantic concept sense, and the suggestion that was what 
referred to after the attitude term in propositional attitude contexts was a complete thought is 
what have inspired current standards for analysing propositional attitude ascriptions. 
 
 
 
In Freges view sense and thoughts are not subjective ideas; they are rather commonly shared 
mode of presentation. Freges concept of thought and sense was of something abstract, 
universal and true. He said: “They are not prevented form grasping the same sense; but they 
cannot have the same idea.” (Frege 60). His solution to the puzzle is the beginning of the 
claims of standard syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. This because his 
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concept of thought and how terms could refer to something other than material objects is a 
past version of the concept of propositions and foregoer for the claim that that-clauses refer to 
mind and language independent propositions.
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1.4 The standard syntactic analysis 
 
According to the standard syntactic analysis the correct syntactic way to analyse propositional 
attitude description is to take the predicates like believes, knows, loves, thinks, etc. as two-
place relation predicates standing in between two singular terms. This means that a predicate 
in syntactic analysis can be described as a function to truth that takes two objects. It is true 
that ‘John believes that snow is white’ if John exists and the proposition refers to by ‘that 
snow is white’ exist and John actually stand in a belief relation to this proposition. The name 
refers to a person, the verb refers to an attitude relation like believe, know, love etc., and the 
that-clause which syntactically is seen as a singular term refers or denote a proposition. A 
that-clause is the subordinate clause in all propositional attitude ascriptions which starts with 
and includes the term ‘that’. These expressions are to be taken according to the standard 
syntactic analysis as singular terms, like names are singular terms, and referring to existent 
propositions. It is worth noticing; it is not the that-clause in itself that is the proposition. This 
is important because the role that the concept of propositions is supposed to occupy cannot be 
engaged by anything that is mind and language specific like a that-clause. To illustrate this 
see that it is implausible to think that the English words ‘that snow is white’ can be the 
universal referent of all that-clauses in all languages as one must say if one hold that ‘that 
snow is white’ is the actual proposition. Mind and language independent propositions act as 
what is common regardless of what sentences one takes as expressing the proposition. For 
example; ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Snø er hvitt’ both express the same thing because both express 
the same proposition. And a that-clause by it selves is not mind and language independent.  
 
Sententialism is a thesis that presents an alternative to structured-propositionalism, and 
structured-propositionalism is as said before implied in the standard syntactic analysis. 
Sententialism, as opposed to structured-propositionalism, claims that the object of thought is a 
linguistic entity and not a proposition. This makes it problematic explaining and accounting 
for the supposed universality of our thoughts, that which is common for all rational beings. 
This is something that the construction of propositions contributes in philosophy; propositions 
are mind and language independent and there existence is taken as justifying the claim that 
sentences are true or false. According to propositionalism propositions are true and that means 
that sentences that express propositions are true. And by expressing a true proposition we are 
making a true claim or by saying that something is a fact, this is validated. This was just a 
little on the background of propositions for as a subject this is beside the focus of this paper. I 
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will mention these kinds of arguments again anyhow, especially as they become relevant 
when mentioning alternative parsing theories. And they are an important part in many 
alternative theories reason for presenting an alternative to the standard analysis.  
 
 
The standard syntactic analysis thinks that that-clauses refers to propositions by functioning 
as a singular term, which means that it is a unit with the same functional operation as a name. 
Here one can see the influence from Frege as he held that what comes after the attitude term 
in opaque contexts was a single unit, a thought. In syntactic analysis this singular term refers 
to mind- and language- independent propositions. In standard analysis when given an example 
of an ordinary propositional attitude ascription as for example: 
 
 
[1] Bill believes that cats are mammals.  
 
 
The standard syntactic analysis claims that ‘believes’ is a two-place relation predicate that 
stands between the name of a person who believes, in this case ‘Bill’, and a singular term ‘that 
cats are mammals’ which is referring to the proposition which is what Bill believes in this 
specific situation. Therefore there are three major syntactical components in the initial 
analysis of a propositional attitude ascription; a) a name referring to a person, b) a singular 
term, operating much like a name, referring to a proposition, and c) the predicate stating the 
relation between the person and the proposition. This is the standard way to analyse 
propositional attitude ascription sentence and indirect reports sentence syntactically. There are 
only three syntactic components in the analysis and if the that-clause was not stipulated as a 
unit, as a singular term, this number would be different as it is obvious that the that-clause 
includes semantic terms and many other possible syntactic units. An analysis of propositional 
attitude ascription will give [1] the parsing and schematic form of;  
 
 
[1x]  aBp 
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In this case a stands for the normal proper name, B stands for the predicate and p is the 
singular term, which is acting like a name referring to a mind and language independent 
proposition. This is the schematic form of any proposition attitude ascriptions which has a 
predicate that takes two objects.  
 
I find it difficult to automatically accept the claims of the standard syntactic analysis. But I 
will accept them if there are valid and substantial reasons for these claims. The disagreement 
here is also ontological; I admit that I do not think there is something real, existing, true etc. in 
the world that corresponds to what is supposedly being designated by ‘proposition’ at least 
not how the concept propositions is conceived by the defenders of the standard syntactic 
analysis in this paper. I could accept it as an explicit theoretical construction while awaiting 
another account of truth. It would be almost impossible make me accept it as an ontological 
entity. But the main focus in this paper is not the ontological disagreements. Independent 
from these ontological considerations I find ‘that’ an unnatural part of the subordinate clause. 
And I am not convinced by the support of the claim that that-clauses are singular terms. The 
advocates of the that-clause think that the contribution of ‘that’ is needed in the subordinate 
clause to make it a singular term, as opposed to a sentence or utterance, and that only then can 
it refer to propositions. This seems as a fundamental claim and opponents of the syntactic 
analysis also rely on this claim and use this to argue against the that-clause. A.N Prior claims 
that by taking ‘that’ out of the that-clause one can thereby eliminated it as a name and make it 
impossible for it to refer to propositions (Prior 17). That-clauses are obviously semantically 
complex, as is seen in for example ‘that cats are mammals’. And they are not like the other 
two components in propositional attitude ascriptions; it is no unified agreement as to what 
grammatical type of expression they are and they are not tokens of a standard grammatical 
class like ‘believe’, ‘know’ etc. are predicates and ‘John’ is a proper name. Philosophers that 
support the that-clause can say that that-clauses were originally complex noun phrases. ‘That 
snow is white’ is a subordinate clause that could be a complex noun phrase. I wish to 
investigate that-clauses and the support and explanation it is possible to give for them being 
singular terms. But first I’ll present a theory which claims the same as the standard syntactic 
analysis, and presents reasons for why ‘that’ belongs in the subordinate part of PAAs. I will 
also see if there are explanations of the that-clause and how it functions as a singular term. 
After this I’ll investigate what type of linguistic expression that-clauses can be. The function 
of being a singular term is something that can be stipulated and validated by use, thereby 
making an expression a singular term. I think that if one cannot place the that-clause as a 
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normal type of singular term in the language then this will make the account of that-clause as 
a singular term less plausible. I will use the method of exclusion to exhaust the possibilities in 
determining what type of singular term the that-clause can be. It is plausible that that-clause 
advocate must specify what and why that-clauses are singular terms, and explain the 
supposition that ‘that’ is needed in the subordinate clause to make it a singular term referring 
to propositions.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Stephen Schiffer 
 
Stephen Schiffer’s description of a typical Fregean view shall represent a theory which 
supports the standard syntactic analysis. I will concentrate on what he takes to be the core of 
Fregeanism as he describes it in his article “Pleonastic Fregeanism”. In this article he makes 
explicit some defining points on the Fregean view of propositional attitude ascriptions. In 
addition to this, he also writes about his own Fregean theory which he calls Pleonastic 
Fregeanism. I will not argue against the theory Pleonastic Fregeanism in a direct way. It is a 
development of a Fregean theory and in that sense it does not part from the Fregean notion 
that it is the that-clause which is the subordinate clause of propositional attitude ascriptions. 
What is special with Pleonastic Fregeanism is that it claims that the relation between that-
clause and the concept of proposition is a constitutive relation. Schiffer says that for anyone to 
know the concept of propositions is for them to engage in a that-clause-involving practice 
(Schiffer 10). There are not many contemporary philosophers who think that the relationship 
between that-clauses and proposition is of such a nature. Claims like these are not directly 
influenced by my conclusions regarding the syntactic parsing of PAAs. Still, if the term ‘that’ 
is not a part of the subordinate-clause of PAAs, then this is something that will be relevant for 
all who parse propositional attitude ascriptions in the traditional or the standard syntactical 
manner, and this includes Stephen Schiffer’s Pleonastic Fregeanism. 
 
Schiffer says in the article “Pleonastic Fregeanism” that Fregeans and others assert that 
propositions are mind- and language- independent and that ordinary that-clauses refer to these 
mind- and language- independent propositions (1). The claim is metaphysical and ontological 
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in virtue of claiming that propositions are existing entities with certain properties, the second 
statement expresses that it is that-clauses that refers to these propositions. Fregeans 
specifically are mentioned as holding these claims. He mentions two motivating reasons for 
why Fregeans should maintain that predicates like believe etc. are two place relation predicate 
which is true of believers and the thing they believe and that the that-clause are singular terms 
referring to what the person in question believes. He says: 
 
 
It’s arguably the best way to account for the way [a given propositional attitude 
ascriptions] truth value is determined by its semantically relevant parts. Second, it’s 
arguably the best way to account for the evident validity of such derivations as the 
following [2]: Ralph believes that George Eliot adored groundhogs, and so does Hilda. 
Thus; there is something that they both believe – to wit, that George Eliot adored 
groundhogs. (Schiffer 2).  
 
 
Since the standard syntactic analysis is highly influenced by Frege and since Schiffer thinks 
that these are reasons for Fregeans to maintain the standard analysis I assume that these 
should be reasons for all to agree with the claims of the standard syntactic theory. The second 
reason he presents is reckoned as the main reason for why one should take that-clause as a 
singular term and therefore as a syntactic unit. This is an important argument for those that 
support the parsing of propositional attitude ascription as it is presented by the standard 
syntactic analysis. The first point he mentions is that the practice of taking predicates as two-
place relation predicates and taking that that-clauses as singular terms referring to a 
proposition, is the best explanation we have of the truth value of these sentences and their 
parts relation to truth value. This is interference to best explanation argument. The argument 
is claiming that the standard syntactic parsing is comparative best in explaining sentences 
syntactic and semantic parts contribution to the truth value. I suppose that what he has in mind 
here is specifically the explanation of the parts contribution to truth value when one apply the 
substitution principle in propositional attitude ascriptions. The introduction of a that-clause 
referring to a thought and the introduction of sense to accommodate apparently co-referential 
objects gives the advocates of this parsing an opportunity to avoid the puzzle about attitude 
contexts. I do not think that he is right in claiming that this gives the best explanation. Donald 
Davidson has presented an alternative parsing of indirect speech reports and this has been 
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modified and accommodated to propositional attitude ascriptions by Ernest LePore and Barry 
Loewer. The paratactic theory is a well formed theory that present a competing analysis with 
the same standard as the standard syntactic analysis. It can accommodate the troublesome 
implausible consequence that steams from the substitution principle in attitude contexts. This 
theory, the paratactic theory, will be presented later. Personally I am not content with the 
solution to the puzzle which Frege introduced and which have been developed by the standard 
syntactic analysis. I think that the creation of a that-clause as a special unit which refers to 
propositions is implausible. This part of sentences is said to be noun phrases. Well, if ‘that the 
earth is round’ were a noun phrase before it was thought that these noun phrases could be 
what referred to these existing propositions, what kind of noun phrase would look like this 
with two determiners (that and the) before the noun (earth) and with a description of the noun 
(is round)? That the that-clause is a noun phrase is a claim soon to be focused on. Someone 
might point to the fact that if propositions explains a vide range of facts and problems then 
maybe it refers to something that is true, after all we believe the world we live in is inert 
coherent. And this is true, but the problem with the concept of proposition is that it is complex 
and entails quite different things all according to what is believed. And besides this, there is 
nothing suggesting that it refers to something true just because it can explain a multiple of 
concepts and problems, for example sentences, truth, facts etc. Because all of these concepts 
are not independent from each other, and one can in advance assume that if there is something 
that gives an explanation of for example truth it could probably explain facts etc. too.  
 
 
The second argument is also interference to best explanation argument. This is viewed as one 
of the fundamental reasons for why you should believe in propositions and takes that-clauses 
as singular terms referring to propositions. The support comes from the logical form and 
logical interferences in arguments revolving attitudes. Schiffer says that treating the that-
clause as a logical unit gives the best explanation of derivations in attitude arguments. Here 
are some examples to illustrate that there must be something that can be common and function 
as or constitute a unit when reviving arguments about attitudes.  
 
If Ralph believes X and Hilda believe what Ralph believes, one can conclude that Hilda and 
Ralph both believe X. If Ralph believes [that John is sad] and Hilda believes whatever Ralph 
believes then Hilda believes [that John is sad]. The possibility to treat the that-clause as a 
logical unit in arguments like these entails that the that-clauses can replace X and suggests 
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that the that-clause refers to something that is common and constitutes a natural unit. It is 
short ways from stating that it refers to something that more than one person can believe too 
argue that the thing they believe must be mind independent e.g. something like propositions. 
This argument shows that we logically conclude that the that-clause functions as a singular 
term. But does this argument entail that if there are other expressions that can function as a 
logical unit in arguments these must be singular terms?  
 
What if I said; John believes [Martha is going home] and Jenny believes everything that John 
believes, then Jenny believe [Martha is going home]. Isn’t this also a valid argument? In this 
case the logical unit is a sentence and not a that-clause. Does this entail that all sentences are 
singular terms with an ability to refer to something as a unit? I’ll admit that the exclusion of 
the term ‘that’ in these examples makes the arguments less pleasing to the ear than the latter 
example, but this does not make the argument invalid. One can still conclude that Ralph 
believes X and Hilda believe what Ralph believes, thus they both believe X, and assert that in 
some of these cases X is not a that-clause but a sentence. The upshot from this is that it seems 
as the term ‘that’ don’t need to be a part of the subordinate clause for there to be an 
explanation of the logical structure in arguments revolving attitudes. Besides this, I think the 
reason why one naturally want to include the term ‘that’ with the subordinate clause in 
examples like this can be partly explained by pragmatic considerations. There are pragmatic 
and not syntactic reasons for keeping the term ‘that’ connected to the belief aspect in ordinary 
talking situations and in the conclusion of the argument Schiffer presents. In examples like;  
 
[3] “What du you believe?” Answer: “That the earth is round.”  
 
The ‘that’ seems to link a belief aspect into the answer and imply that the statement one is 
expressing is a belief, whiteout having to state the tidies and obvious ‘I believe that…’ or ‘I 
believe…’. If one where simply to state the belief ‘The earth is round’ this would seem to 
violate some communication and normative rules for then this statement would occupy the 
property of truth and not invite the other person to reflect upon the statement. The person 
saying this will not show a satisfactory degree of self awareness; that it is in ones opinion that 
the earth is round. If one on the other hand were in a social setting where social norms where 
unimportant relevant to truth then one probably would exclude ‘that’ thereby signalling that 
this statement actually occupies truth. What I am suggesting is that “That the earth is round” 
is just a pragmatic shortening of ‘I believe that the earth is round’ or ‘I believe the earth is 
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round’. After having said this, I admit that this is not a sufficient argument for settling the 
case. I will therefore move on. This was just an alternative explanation of why it is natural to 
include ‘that’ in the conclusion of reporting what both Ralph and Hilda believed. It has 
become the norm and we think that which parts from the norm is unnatural.  
 
 
I am not committed to claim that the term ‘that’ belongs syntactically with the predicate in 
PAAs, but the that-clause advocate must claim that ‘that’ it is a part of the subordinate clause 
and this therefore imply that the term ‘that’ contributes something to making the expression a 
singular term that refers to propositions. What I want to investigate are claims like these; that 
‘that’ contributes and makes the expression a singular term and that-clauses are singular 
terms. The subordinate clause was perhaps seen as a noun phrases originally. I wonder what 
explanation of the that-clause as a singular term it is possible for the that clause advocate to 
give. Ian Rumfitt who will be presented later takes that-clauses as the subordinate clause of 
indirect report sentences and he assumes that that-clauses are noun phrases (Rumfitt 430). 
This is not controversial as it is common to think that that-clauses are noun phrases. I will see 
if they can be noun phrases given the other claims of the that-clause advocate and find out 
what type of noun phrase that-clauses can be. I hope to conclude that they can not be noun 
phrases, and that this then will weaken the support of the claim that they are singular terms. It 
will not make it impossible for that-clauses to be singular terms; they can be singular term 
making up a unique type of singular term. But what I suggest is that this will weaken the 
account as they would have to say that that-clauses are singular terms but not of any familiar 
type. I assume that there should be some account or explanation of the that-clause as a 
singular term possible to give, for it to be a liable account. I will start by investigating if that-
clauses are singular terms like proper names, complex names or complex noun phrases are 
singular terms. I think that if that-clauses are neither of these types this weakens the account 
of that-clauses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 The that-clause as a complex name 
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The possibility I will be considering now is whether a that-clause is a singular term like a 
proper name or a complex name. This is one of the possibilities the that-clause advocate has 
to explain how that-clauses are singular terms. He could say that they are singular terms in the 
same way complex names are. Since it is reasonable to see the that-clause as complex singular 
terms the major comparison will be between the that-clause and complex names. But the 
argument is relevant for both those that would compare the that-clause with a complex name 
and those who would compare it with a singular proper name. Why this is so will be 
explained in what follows. Complex names as for example ‘Big Ben’, ‘The Bill of Rights, 
‘Mount Everest’ are proper names in spite of that they are made up of parts that if taken 
separately would be meaningful. They function like proper names do and therefore the 
complex expression which makes up the name does not at the same time have an operational 
meaningful content. The meaningful parts they would have as an expression and not a name 
are neither what determine or make them proper names. What make them proper names are 
co-determined by functioning the way a name in the language is supposed to function and 
their reference. Ordinary proper names as ‘Jane’, ‘Peter’ have semantic value and they 
function as proper names regardless of not being made up from parts that if taken separately 
can be said to have a meaning13. That means if complex names are names at all this is because 
they function syntactically and semantically like these ordinary simple proper names does and 
used in the same way as ordinary proper names are used.  
 
A proper name significant semantic property is that it denotes or refers to an object. What 
makes ordinary names and complex names different from each other is that the latter happens 
to be made up from words that apart from in some cases functioning like a name also can 
express a meaningful content if not functioning like a name. In this respect the parts that 
would be meaningful if the words are taken separately are similar to the pragmatic effect of 
names like these; ‘Joy’, ‘Apple’, ‘Paradise’ etc. These names have nothing semantically to do 
with the condition ‘joy’, the noun ‘apple’ or the name of a place ‘paradise’. To see this; the 
semantic meaning of  the name ‘Joy’ does not involve semantic reference either to the 
condition joy or to the sense of the expression ‘joy’ when it is referring to the condition of 
having fun. This can be proved easily for if someone claimed; “Joy is not a joy” and the first 
                                                 
13
 The contribution from a letter is different from the semantic contribution of a word. One does not claim that it 
is the semantic value of ‘J’ that makes the name ‘Joy’ into a name, as said before letters do not have meaning, 
this semantic property is constrained to words. 
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word in the sentence in fact is a proper name referring to a person there would be nothing in 
the semantics or syntax of that proper name that would in any sense make this sentence claim 
a contradiction true. The effect of naming your child with a word that also has another 
meaning is solely a pragmatic effect and it does not have a meaning in semantic and 
syntactical theory. The reason that I have mentioned this is to make it clear that in the case of 
complex names, what could have been a complex meaningful expression were the term not in 
fact a name, example the ‘The Bill of Rights’, the would-be-meaning of this is a pragmatic 
effect. If one has a case of a term function like a name then what would be meaningful part 
becomes inoperative. The semantic character or property of the word ‘right’ does not 
contribute in the name ‘The Bill of Rights’ in the same way the condition of being happy does 
not contribute to the name ‘Joy’. The result is in the comparison between proper names and 
the complex names; meaningful parts in these two groups can have some pragmatic effect and 
this can be confusing, but in respect to the semantic character of them as names this meaning 
is irrelevant. If there were complex expressions that would function in use sometimes as a 
description and sometimes as a name, one would say that in the use when it functions like a 
description it is not a name, and vice versa. Just like when ‘Joy’ is used as a proper name, it is 
effectively marked by writing it with a big capital, and then it is clearly not at the same time a 
noun phrase referring to the condition of having fun, and when ‘joy’ is used as a noun phrase 
referring to the condition of having fun it is not at the same time also referring to a person 
named Joy and this is marked by not writing it with a big capital. These exclude each other. 
And complex names do not have an operational meaningful content.  
 
Where I am going with this specification of having an operational meaningful content and the 
condition of being a proper name is that this little fact will make it impossible for the 
advocates of the that-clause to claim that the that-clause is a singular term like a complex 
name is a singular term. He can say that the that-clause is like a complex name and with this 
intend to say that they both are singular term.14 But this claim then is neither an explanation 
nor anything that can function like epistemic support for the claim that that-clauses are 
singular terms. The difficulty with a claim that the that-clause is a singular term like a 
complex name is a singular term is that there is an internal contradiction between the 
upcoming two statements, of course given that what I have said about proper names and 
complex names is true;  
                                                 
14
 Or a proper name. This will be the same, as I have explained. 
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1) The that-clause is a singular term that functions as a complex name of propositions.  
 
2) The term ‘that’ is contributing semantically in the that-clause. 
 
These two statements and what have been explained about complex names and how they 
function are not compatible. I have tried to show that if something is a complex name or a 
proper name its meaningful parts are necessary irrelevant and not operational. What the that 
clause advocate which thinks that the that-clause is a singular name in the same way proper 
names or complex names are singular terms wants to say, apart from claiming this, is that the 
term ‘that’ is contributing semantically in the that-clause, and making the that-clause a 
singular term. According to my arguments this last claim is impossible. In Etymology the 
semantic property of words in complex names is relevant, but we are considering words form 
a philosophical view and then it is the universal properties not contingent features that are 
relevant. Also, in a name like ‘Joy’ there is a contribution of the letter ‘J’ but this is not 
comparable to the contribution a semantic character ‘that’ would have to contribute. The 
contribution from a letter is different from the semantic contribution of a word. One does not 
claim that it is the semantic value of ‘J’ that makes the name ‘Joy’ into a name because letters 
do not have meaning, this is constrained to words. It has been shown that complex names do 
not take semantic contribution from their parts in determining the semantic of the expression. 
An advocate of the that-clause want to claim that ‘that’ is contributing to and that it is a part 
of the subordinate clause of PAAs. But claiming that there is a semantic part in the singular 
term of any given proposition which content contributes semantically is inconsistent with 
ordinary understanding of how complex and proper names function. So it is impossible that 
the that-clause can be a singular term like a complex name is a singular term while at the 
same time that ‘that’ can contribute semantically in the that-clause. 
 
We then have to consider the possibilities of changing some of the claims. The most certain 
assumption out of these three is the assumption that proper names and complex names 
function the way it have been presented. This is therefore not something that will be revised. 
A possibility is to abandon the claim that ‘that’ is contributing semantically in that-clauses. 
This would be a satisfactory outcome for me because this would take me further along in 
proving that ‘that’ is not a part in the subordinate clause of PAAs at all. However this is 
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probably not the claim that will be adjusted first. The statement in this argument that is most 
likely to be wrong is the claim that the that-clause is a singular term in the same way that 
proper names or complex names are singular terms. The nearest I have got to finding 
philosopher claiming this is those who claim that that-clauses are like names, but this can be a 
simplification, a way of describing the property of being a singular term for the sake of 
communication. I will therefore move on to the next alternative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 The that-clause as a complex noun phrase  
 
 
What I will be considering now if it is possible for the that-clause to be a complex noun 
phrase. If it were established that it were a complex noun phrase it is possible that the support 
of it being a singular term would come from it being a noun phrases. At least this explanation 
of the that-clause would give some explanation of it as a singular term, and make it seem less 
constructed. It would not automatically need a special account for why this is a syntactic unit 
or an explanation of how it functions like a singular term since it would be assumed that it 
would function as a singular term like a noun phrase would. Previously, I have considered if 
that-clause are singular terms in the same way complex names and proper names are singular 
terms. Proper names, and this includes complex names are a subcategory, are nouns but there 
are other types of terms that denote objects that are nouns too. Nouns can be defined as those 
terms that denote object/s; this object can include a more than one thing as is seen when a 
group is referred to as an object. According to English Grammar: Theory and Use; “…noun 
phrases are referring units: they identify what we are talking or writing about.” (Hasselgård, 
Johansson, Lysvåg. 82). Most common is it perhaps to regard nouns as terms that denote 
single entities for example a boy, a book, the school. It could be claimed that these nouns 
denoting entities is the archetype of nouns. However, proper names are another contender for 
being the archetype of nouns but since proper names are such an important category it will 
probably always be considered as a single category, if it were not, then there would be a good 
chance for proper names to be a defining type. What I shall be considering in this section is if 
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that-clauses are like complex noun phrases. Proper names and pronouns are sometimes 
described as noun phrases but then this term means the same as nouns, what will be 
considered now are noun phrases that are apparently complex. A complex noun phrase is a 
compound expression; it is a unit made up of a noun or a pronoun and some supplementary 
terms. The supplementary terms are either contributing in determining the noun (the, a) or 
complementing it (that-clauses, the so-and-so of his father) or help specify the reference of 
the noun (the red so-and-so, the big so-and-so). Here are some examples of noun phrases; 
‘the king of Norway’, ‘the claim that the earth is round’, ‘the girl wearing a big hat’, ‘the 
book on the table’, ‘a table, and ‘that book’. The nouns in these examples are; ‘king’, ‘claim, 
‘girl’, ‘book’, ‘table’ and ‘book’ and the terms remaining, which is highlighted are 
supplementary terms. 
 
As a curiosity I can mention that in current grammar the that-clause by it self is held as 
something that complements a noun. One of the examples just given of noun phrases was a 
noun phrase with a that-clause as a complement (e.g. the claim that the earth is round). In 
current grammar the that-clause is seen as a declarative content clause which functions as a 
complement to a noun in a noun phrase. I hope this will not be a confusing curiosity because 
this is something else than what I am considering. What is to be considered in this section is if 
that-clauses can be noun phrases, the fact that a that-clause together with a noun can form a 
noun phrase does not imply that the that-clause by it selves is a noun phrase. On the other 
hand, the that-clause is mentioned as a grammatical class and this makes it appear established. 
If my considerations are right and propositional attitude ascriptions are wrongly parsed this 
will be in conflict with current grammatical holdings. This therefore gives the support of the 
that-clause an extra dimension and raises the demand of arguments needed to support my 
view.15  
 
As said before, because the advocates of the that-clause are determined to claim that the that-
clause is a singular term then one can investigate whether they are singular terms like noun 
phrases are singular terms. This will be my intention in this section, but not all philosophers 
think this is a subject that needs much consideration. According to Matthew McGrath in his 
                                                 
15
 Having said that, I think grammar for a huge part is a descriptive science and that if the that-clause is treated 
by people as a unit it will be reflected in current grammar without there being more substantial arguments in 
support of taking it as a unit. Another point to mention is that there is no good reason to assume that the 
entailments from grammatical assumptions are coherent with logical and underlying structure- considerations. 
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internet article “Propositions” from Stanford Encyclopaedia it is plainly evident that that-
clauses can neither be proper names nor noun phrases. To explain this he says in a footnote;  
 
”…they [that-clauses] are neither nouns themselves nor phrases headed by a noun. The 
word ‘that’ in ‘that snow is white’ is not a noun which is modified by the words 
following, but rather a complementizer, like ‘whether” 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html#2). 
 
In this passage from an article on propositions McGrath mention some types of singular terms 
which the that-clause can not be, specific he says that that-clauses neither can be nouns nor 
noun phrases. Here he also gives a positive account of what type of term ‘that’ is in that-
clauses; he says that ‘that’ is a term that functions like a ‘complementizer’ in that-clauses. 
This last claim e.g. the possibility of taking the term ‘that’ as a ‘complementizer’ and what 
this explanation could mean for the that-clause advocate is something that will be considered 
later. When we come to that part it will be defined what it means to label a term 
‘complementizer’. However, McGrath is not the only philosopher mentioned in this paper 
who describes the term ‘that’ in that-clauses as a ‘complementizer’. Ian Rumfitt in the article 
“Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised” starts his paper by 
introducing some claims of the philosopher A.N. Prior. When presenting Priors claims about 
the parsing of propositional attitude ascriptions he says; 
 
 “…the particle that" in (1) - the complementizer" in the linguists' argot - belongs semantically 
with the verb…”  
(Rumfitt 430).  
 
According to this statement Rumfitt believes that Prior asserts that the term ‘that’ is a 
semantic “complementizer” to verbs in propositional attitude reports and indirect speech 
reports. However, the difference might be obvious but it is an important difference to stress 
the point; it is important to notice that the that-clause advocate claims that the term ‘that’ is a 
complementizer in the subordinate clause of PAAs thereby making it a that-clause. In contrast 
Prior apparently thinks that ‘that’ is a complementizer to the predicate or verb. They will 
therefore disagree on the parsing of propositional attitude ascriptions while at the same time 
will both say that the term ‘that’ functions as a complementizer. The possibility of explaining 
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‘that’ as a complementizer and what this would entail for the that-clause advocate and Priors 
theory will be considered later in the paper.  
 
At present time what interests me about the explanation given by McGrath is his 
uncomplicated and non-comprehensive argument for why that-clauses cannot be noun 
phrases. If he is right, then perhaps I should not investigate this possibility any further. I do 
not want to waste time on something that is obvious. Let us return to his arguments on this 
point. First he claims that that-clauses cannot be proper names because they are not nouns, 
and secondly he claims they can not be noun phrases because they are not phrases headed by a 
noun and this last claim is supported by him saying in the next sentence:”…the word ‘that’ in 
‘that snow is white’ is not a noun which is modified by the words following…” 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html#2). 
 
I do not believe that the question of whether the that-clauses are nouns or noun phrases can be 
dismissed as an option just by stating what he is stating here. But to be fair to McGrath, his 
article is on propositions and he did not, and probably did not intend to, say much about what 
type of singular term the that-clause could be. However I think that this last claim is 
unwarranted. He seem to assume that ‘that’ must be taken as the head of the noun phrase and 
he claims that this is not possible because evidently the term ‘that’ is not a noun which gets 
modified by the other words following, as he says. I believe that this argument is partly 
wrong. It is wrong because in noun phrases it is accepted that both nouns and pronouns can be 
the head of the phrase. According to English Grammar: Theory and Use: “Noun phrases are 
of two main types: noun-headed phrases (or full noun phrases) and Pronoun-headed phrases.” 
(Hasselgård, Johansson, Lysvåg, 1998, s.82). The term ‘that’ is usually a distal demonstrative, 
it is a pronoun which usually refers to a distal object (ref). Therefore there is nothing 
impossible with ‘that’ being the head of the noun phrase, making it a pronoun-headed phrase. 
But this is only one of his claims and he could be right in his other statements. He can be right 
in claiming that the following words do not function as a supplement or what he called 
modifiers of the possible referent of the ‘that’ term. This will be similar to my approach when 
denying that the that-clause is a noun phrase. And another point regarding his arguments; he 
seems to assume that the term ‘that’ needs to be the head of the noun phrase, this is wrong. 
Whatever is the head of a compound expression is the word that determines the syntactic type 
of the expression, but the head need not be the first chronological word in the phrase and so 
there is more than one term that can be the noun or pronoun in the supposed noun phrase. He 
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might be right in his main claim; that that-clauses are neither nouns nor noun phrases. 
However, he is not right simply from the fact that ‘that’ is not a noun, because there is a 
possibility for ‘that’ to function as the head, as a pronoun, and there is also the possibility that 
some other term in the that-clause could be the head of this noun phrase.  
 
 
 
 
Now it is time to investigate if that-clauses can be noun phrases and be singular terms like 
noun phrases are singular terms. When comparing an example of a that-clause, for example 
‘that dogs are mammals’, with the noun phrase ‘the book on the table’ what do these two 
straight off have in common? What they have in common is that;    
 
a. they are both supposed to work as a single unit within a main sentence.   
b. they both begin with a term that is a typical modifier in a noun phrase (e.g. that, the).  
c. they both appear as complex expression and they function syntactically like singular terms.  
 
These are three important similarities and there are thereby some similarities between the that-
clause and the typical noun phrase. But is it enough to give support for the hypothesis that 
that-clauses are noun phrases? If one looks as the surface similarities of a that-clause, for 
example ‘that dogs are mammals’, and a noun phrase, for example ‘the book on the table’,  
they seem very much alike. I however do not think that this comparison can be supplemented 
and I will present my arguments for why the that-clause cannot be a noun phrase. The 
arguments if successful will be arguments of exclusion. That means that I will investigate if 
that-clauses can be a noun phrases by analysing them as noun phrases. If the analysis and 
account of that-clauses as noun phrases lead to consequences which are internal incoherent or 
unmistakably wrong this is reason not to accept that that-clauses are singular terms like noun 
phrases are singular terms. So I am aiming at excluding them from this possibility. When I 
present a analyse of the that-clause as noun phrases is it not because I believe this gives a true 
account of the that-clause, but because it is a possible account of the that-clause and therefore 
I wish to investigate it. I hope to exclude the possibility of plausible explaining the that-clause 
as a noun phrase.  
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As stated, a noun phrase is a composite expression made up of a noun, or a pronoun, and 
terms that specify, complement or help determine the referent of the noun. If noun phrases are 
complex expressions then the that-clause also would have to be complex expressions made up 
from a noun and some supplementary terms. Of course, one cannot claim that the that-clause 
is a singular term just like a noun phrase is a singular term and intend this to mean that they 
only have one thing in common and that is that both have the property of being a singular 
term. There has to be some similarities between the that-clause and complex noun phrases that 
makes the that-clause a type of noun phrase. When presented with a that-clause one must 
analyse the that-clause to find the components that define a noun phrase then. Complex noun 
phrases include a noun and some supplementary terms. The first possibility to consider is if 
the term ‘that’ in for example ‘that dogs are mammals’ is the noun in the supposed noun 
phrases, or to be correct, in this case it would have to be a pronoun in a pronoun-headed 
complex noun phrase. This is one of the possibilities. But when considering the function of 
that-clauses; they are supposed to refer or denote propositions. This is what one takes that-
clauses to refer to, that means that if ‘that’ is the noun in the noun phrase then ‘that’ would 
have to be the main term that refers to propositions in this expression. And this will make the 
following terms ‘dogs are mammals’ supplement terms to the noun. For some this will already 
been dismissed as a viable analyse of the noun and supplementary terms in that-clauses. 
According to common assumption in philosophy today ‘that’ cannot be the main referring 
noun phrase because it is a pronoun and it is therefore too dependent on the remaining 
expression to refer. But to go along with this possibility, one could specify what kind of 
supplement terms the remaining words would be and it would be obvious that they are helping 
to specifying the referent of the noun.16 In the case of ‘that’ as the noun; ‘that’ is supposed to 
refer to the proposition and what follow are just a specification and a description of this 
proposition. But then, what about examples of propositional attitude ascriptions where the 
term ‘that’ is not explicitly mentioned? It is not the norm but it is common enough to exclude 
‘that’ in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports to make this suggestion 
that the term ‘that’ is what function as the noun in the noun phrase seem implausible. Some 
examples where ‘that’ is excluded; ‘John said Marry is a princess’, ‘He believes the earth is 
round’ and ‘I know Peter is having an affair’. If the term ‘that’ is the head of the complex 
noun phrases and it therefore is the noun referring to propositions in that-clauses and indirect 
speech reports, then how can one account for the plausible and common possibility of 
                                                 
16
 The other possibilities; determining, modifying, complementing. 
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excluding the term ‘that’ from propositional attitude ascriptions all together?  ‘That’ can not 
be the head of the phrase if it is not a necessary term in the phrase. I think this argument is so 
strong that this settles the case. This suggests that this picture of the that-clause as a noun 
phrase where ‘that’ is the noun and the rest is supplementary terms is wrong.  
 
 
 
 
I have now presented one version of how the that-clause can be a noun phrase and fulfilling 
the criteria of what makes something a noun phrase. This is not the only possibility for how 
the that-clause can be a noun phrase. I mentioned that there is no need for the noun in the 
noun phrase to be the first chronological word in the phrase.17 So there is a possibility of 
claiming that another term than ‘that’ is the noun in the supposed noun phrase. Someone 
could hold for example that the term ‘dogs’ in ‘that dogs are mammals’ is the noun in the 
supposed complex noun phrase. In this case ‘that’ would be the modifier in the noun phrase 
(like the function of a, the etc.). However it is obvious that ‘that dogs’ is an ungrammatical 
expression and that this therefore can not be a right analysis. It seems like ‘that’ can not 
function as a supplement for ‘dogs’ or any other term that hypothetically would be the noun in 
the phrase because ‘that’ does not work as supplement for any of these grammatically. If the 
term ‘that’ is to be taken as a supplement term and contributing in determining the noun in the 
noun phrase, then it has to be that ‘that’ is a noun phrase modifier for the entire remaining 
phrase and that this entire remaining phrase must be the noun. This would be the third 
suggestion of a complex noun phrase analysis of the that-clause. To give an example, this 
would mean that a that-clause like ‘that dogs are mammals’ must have two main components 
and those two are the supplement term ‘that’ and the noun phrase ‘dogs are mammals’. This 
obeys the criteria of having minimum two syntactic components which is the amount that 
complex noun phrases should have if they are to be called complex noun phrases. This makes 
that-clauses for example ‘that dogs are mammals’ a complex noun phrase which in syntactic 
form or parsing is equivalent to noun phrases like ‘that book’ or ‘this chair’ etc.18 According 
to this suggestion the term ‘that’ functions as to determinate the noun. This seems as a 
reasonable suggestion as to the function of ‘that’. This means that ‘that’ functions as a 
demonstrative in this analysis and to speak in images; pointing to the referent of the noun. But 
                                                 
17
 Just see ’this book’, ’this mighty school’ etc.   
18
 ’That/dogs are mammals’ is equivalent to ’That/book’. 
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there are some problems with this suggestion. According to common assumptions in 
philosophy is wrong to classify what follows ‘that’ in that-clauses, for example ‘Dogs are 
mammals’, as a noun. There it is no reasonable suggestion as to what would be the object that 
can serve as the referent of this noun phrase. As it stands it is simply not the name of an 
object. Then why can it not be stipulated as the name of an object while we await some 
decision as to what is the referent? The verdict as to what is the referent is determined by 
other considerations than parsing, it has to do with languages connection to the world, 
ontology, metaphysics or consciousness etc. The suggestion that that-clauses refers to mind 
and language independent propositions is an example of construction of an entity that can 
explain not only what we think of as the ‘content part’ in our thoughts or claims but explain 
related concepts like truth, fact, sentence etc. Not all agree that propositions is the referent of 
the content part of PAAs and ISR, some think that we cannot transcendent our language and 
that what we think in language and that what is the subject related to truth is sentences.19 But 
there are other possibilities; the referent might be hold to be facts, if one is satisfied with the 
concept of ‘fact’ and one think that this concept don’t rely one anything that is more 
fundamental in describing truth and the like, or one can claim that the referent is in fact a 
physical brain state. 20 It all depends on what concept one thinks is most right and which can 
do the job of justifying our use (but not all use is valid data) and explaining the other concept 
and statements one thinks are related and gives a satisfying description of the world. And then 
there is the demand that our concept actually describe something that is true. The problem 
with the forgoing suggestion of the that-clause as a noun phrase was that it made the noun in 
the noun phrase a sentence that can not be the noun. Therefore one can conclude that that-
clauses are not noun phrases and that some other explanation of the that-clause is needed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 (Utterances in Davidson’s case) Some might think that truth is a concept belonging with sentences and 
language and for that reason decline the concept of proposition and that-clauses.  
20
 Brain state would lead to some difficulties, they would probably have to be constructed as token types of each 
individual thought, and it would not obey the criteria of universality and objectivity.  
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2.3 ‘That’ as a complementizer 
 
A suggestion that have been mentioned earlier in the texts is that the term ‘that’ in that-
clauses functions as a complementizer. According to Matthew McGrath: “The word ‘that’ in 
‘that snow is white’ is not a noun which is modified by the words following, but rather a 
complementizer, like ‘whether” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html#2). 
And there are also other persons who think of ‘that’ as a complementizer.21 What makes this 
account of the that-clause different from the forgoing is that in claiming this one claim that 
the that-clause functions as a singular term but with straight of a recognition that there are 
different functioning words in the singular term. The problem with claiming that the term 
‘that’ is contributing something in making the that-clause a singular term seems to have a 
clear explanation in this suggestion. It is claimed that ‘that’ is a complementizer and therefore 
that it contributes like a complementizer. It was not a commitment to treat ‘that’ as 
contributing something special in the suggestion that that-clauses are noun phrases, and 
therefore it was not necessary that the contribution of ‘that’, which supposedly makes the 
clause a singular term, would be explained. This account seems much more promising in this 
respect. I understand that making the term ‘that’ included in the subordinate clause will make 
the that-clause surface different from an ordinary claimed sentence (‘that snow is white’ vs. 
‘Snow is white’), but I think that this cannot be the only reason to include ‘that’ with the 
subordinate clause. It would in that case be an idiosyncratic cause. There have to be a valid 
reason in support of this inclusion and that means that ‘that’ will either have to be seen as 
contributing something semantically to the subordinate clause or ‘that’ must be seen as a term 
that syntactically is unable to stand on its own and that it is not the case that it belongs 
syntactically with the verb in propositional attitude ascriptions or indirect speech reports. This 
exhausts the likely possibilities as to where and how to syntactic pars ‘that’.  
 
A complementizer is according to LinguaLinks: “A complementizer is a conjunction which 
marks a complement clause.” 
(http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAComplementizer.htm).  
According to this definition of a complementizer is the syntactic contribution of a 
complementizer minimal. It appears to have two possible functions. It can function as a 
                                                 
21
 A.N Prior, Ian Rumfitt  
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conjunction and as an indicator of a complement clause. If it simply functions as a marker of a 
complement clause will the semantic contribution of the term to the sentences as a whole be 
limited. If it functions as a conjunction and as a marker will the semantic contribution be of a 
larger degree. A conjunction is, according to LinguaLinks: “A conjunction is a word that 
syntactically links words or larger constituents, and expresses a semantic relationship between 
them.” (http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAConjunction.htm).  
 
When complementizers are conjunctions they are therefore a term with the purpose of linking 
or connecting constitutions and expressing a semantic relationship between the constitutions. 
According to LinguaLinks a complementizer is a type of conjunction but is also a term that 
marks a complement clause (e.g. ‘that he said that’, ‘that the door is closed’) and it should be 
obvious that the function of marking something is not the same as that of connecting 
something. This holds even if a single term can do both these things in a sentence. The 
extended explanation of a complement clause in LinguaLinks says among other things that it 
is a nominal sentence that is extra linguistic and that it can express a thought. As this stands it 
is merely a stipulation and it contributes nothing to the arguments whether that-clauses should 
be taken as referring to propositions or if there should be that-clauses at all. I do not wish to 
dependent to much on the grammatical claims for the reason that I have mentioned before; it 
is not only a normative but also a descriptive discipline. And besides this I do not think that 
the claims of grammar have sufficient degree of coherence and correct connection to the 
world and/or fundamental logical structure. What all philosophers want is a language in where 
the subsequently arguments and conclusions do not state something untrue. This is not always 
as easy to attain or produce, and the reason for this is that language follows its own inner rules 
and rationale. The problem is deciding what claims to believe in and what claims to reject. 
There is a structure in language and if a theory demands a bending of structure to 
accommodate it to the theory this is not happily welcomed, on the other hand, the 
grammatical structure and the applied rules does not necessarily reflect the logic behind 
language and so there have to be an evaluation of what is right.  
Then if we do accept the term ‘that’ in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech 
reports as a type of conjunction this means that ‘that’ is sort of a term that operates as to 
connect parts of sentences. And that would say that this is not an account one can give that 
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will justify placing ‘that’ inside the subordinate clause as apposed to leaving it as a 
independent term in these sentences. 
 
 
 
2.4 The that-clause as a singular term  
 
There is a further possibility for the that-clause advocate. He can claim that the that-clause is a 
singular term simply because it functions as a singular term, and this is supported by its 
possibility to function as a logical unit in valid arguments about attitudes. The logical 
arguments revolving attitudes and the implications form this supported the that-clause as a 
singular term. The that-clause advocate could claim that there is no need to specify what type 
of singular term that-clauses that refers to propositions are because they make up a new class. 
I accept this claim as long as the taking of the that-clause as a singular term is supported by 
something else than the mere stipulation of this reference relation. The argument showing that 
that-clauses function as a logical unit in arguments revolving attitude ascriptions is supportive 
of the that-clause account. But it was the question if everything that can be exchanged with a 
singular term in logical arguments also must be a natural singular term? This conclusion that 
the that-clause advocates seem to assume must also count for sentences if they to can be 
exchanged with an X, standing in the place of a singular term, in valid arguments. This is 
apparently related to the object-reading of sentences and propositions. This is a problem that 
is an important motivation for Priors alternative theory.  I am not sure whether fundamental 
logical implications really are implied by these types of logical arguments. However, granted 
that there is a possibility of stipulation the that-clause as a singular term, this is a viable 
possibility. I would be more content with an account of a singular term that could place the 
expression taken as a singular term inside the established and ordinary singular terms. This 
concludes my main argumentative part of the ‘that’ in the that-clause. I will now be viewing 
alternative account on how to parse propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech 
reports.  
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3.1 The theory of A.N Prior 
 
I want to start the explication of the philosopher A.N Prior and his account by paraphrasing 
another philosopher who also is relevant for this subject. The reason for this is that the 
description and interpretation which Rumfitt gives of Priors theory is interesting and will be 
analyzed in what’s to come. Rumfitts own theory will be addressed later because he presents 
his own version of Davidson’s paratactic theory. Davidson creates the paratactic theory that 
does not include terms which refer to propositions, while Rumfitt present a paratactic theory 
that includes reference to propositions. Both will be presented later. In the start of Rumfitts 
article “Content and context: the paratactic theory revisited and revised” he mentions a 
philosopher who holds that ‘that’ is a particle that belongs semantically with the predicate. He 
says:  
 
Even in speaking of this string of words as a constituent [an example of a that-clause], I 
am making an assumption that some would deny. A. N. Prior,(4) for example, held that 
the particle that" in (1) - the complementizer" in the linguists' argot - belongs 
semantically with the verb, so that (1) is to be divided along the lines: 
Galileo / said that / the earth moves. 
On this view of the matter, "to say" is precisely not a transitive verb; rather, it is a part 
of speech that takes a noun-phrase at one end and a complete clause at the other. This 
view is interesting, but it would take me too far from my theme to examine it properly. 
So I will simply assume that the words "that the earth moves" form a phrase as they 
appear in (1); also, that the phrase they form is a noun-phrase. 
 (Rumfitt 430). 
 
 
It is worth noticing that what Rumfitt is talking about is the structure of indirect reports, and 
does not mention propositional attitude ascriptions. But as we have said before most 
philosophers (Stephen Schiffer among them) take propositional attitude ascriptions and 
propositional speech acts, like indirect reports, as the same when it comes to their parsing. I 
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will therefore assume that this does not create a problem. Actually there could be relevant 
differences between propositional attitude ascriptions and propositional speech acts that 
would have an effect on the conclusions drawn about their parsing. But without anyone 
pointing to these differences for the present time, this does not amount to a substantial 
problem. And even if PAA and indirect reports are not alike in the way we assume here, there 
would still be good reasons for doubting the picture that includes ‘that’ with the subordinate 
clause in PAAs if it ever were established that in indirect reports the ‘that’ is to be seen as a 
syntactic part of the predicate. There are therefore good reasons for treating propositional 
attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports as a single group regarding their syntactic 
units.  
 
In the segment paraphrased from Rumfitt he mentions the philosopher A.N. Prior and his 
thoughts on how parse propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports. He said 
that ‘that’ was a complementizer and that it belonged semantically with the verb in PAAs. 
This makes Prior especially interesting as he presents an alternative to the standard syntactic 
analysis. I am especially interested to see the reasons he takes that support this parsing or if 
there are any; reasons not to accept the traditional parsing. His account makes up a competing 
account and present a parsing that initially seem to be close to some of my assumptions or 
suggestions. I want to understand why the term ‘that’ belongs with the subordinate clause in 
PAA and ISR. I do not which to argue for a claim saying that the term ‘that’ and the predicate 
in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports belong together. I would 
welcome such a claim because it entails my goal, but it is not my intention to present any pro-
reasons for this claim. I have tried to do the opposite and discover weaknesses in the claim 
supporting that ‘that’ belongs in the subordinate clause of PAAs. It will be interesting to see 
the reasons presented by Prior. I expect reasons that either supports that ‘that’ belongs with 
the predicate, or reasons explaining why it doesn’t belong with the subordinate clause. It is in 
the book “Objects of Thought” that Prior makes his claims. Prior claim that the term ‘that’ 
forms a syntactic unit with the verb or predicate in propositional attitude ascriptions. He did 
not accept the traditional view claiming that it is the that-clause that is the subordinate clause 
in propositional attitude ascriptions. This is what Prior expresses in this segment from his 
book where he says: 
 
So we eliminate the apparent name ‘that there will be a nuclear war’ and the suggestion 
it carries that the complete sentence expresses a relation between X and the 
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‘proposition’ designate by this name, simply by ceasing to parse the whole as ‘X fears / 
that there will be a nuclear war’ and parsing it instead as ‘X fears that / there will be a 
nuclear war’  
 
(Prior 19). 
 
 In this segment is it expressed that if one for example parse ‘fears that’ as a unit the 
consequence is that the subordinate sentence can no longer be seen as a singular term and he 
says that it thereby has been “eliminated” as a name. According to the standard syntactic 
analysis a that-clause is a syntactic unit that will function like a name and refer to 
propositions, this is something that according to Prior gets ‘eliminated’ when one change the 
syntactic units. He says that when this parsing is held one have eliminated the possibility of 
the subordinate clause referring to a proposition. This must mean that he believed that it could 
not refer to propositions if it weren’t syntactically like a name or a singular term. Prior is 
disagreeing with a view on propositional attitude ascriptions which is the same as that of 
standard syntactic analysis. That’s why I will call it the standard syntactic analyse or the 
traditional view when mentioning the syntactic analysis that Prior is arguing against, In the 
standard syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions sentences are formed from two 
names and a predicate term which is usually in the middle, in contrast to Priors theory where 
sentences are formed from a name, a expression and another sentence (17). He accepts that 
there is nothing wrong in taking ‘believes that’ as a two-place belief predicate when there is a 
name in the first and in the subordinate place. But he disagrees with the standard syntactic 
analysis that will take it to be a name in the subordinate place after the predicate in 
propositional attitude ascriptions. He holds that there is a sentence in the subordinate place in 
these propositional attitude ascriptions. He says: 
  
…they [predicates/connectives] do not express relations between the object designated 
by the name attached at the left and the object designated by the name attached at the 
right, because what is attached at the right isn’t  a name but a sentence, and so doesn’t 
designate anything whatever. 
(Prior 19). 
 
What motivates the claim, e.g. that the last syntactic part is in fact a sentence will be 
explained later. This is connected to him being a proponent of sententialism. At first I had 
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trouble finding the basic arguments supporting his theory on propositional attitude ascriptions. 
I was wondering whether he claimed that what comes last syntactically in PAAs are sentences 
and if it was this that supported his other statements, or if he thought as I did in the beginning 
that there might be foundation for claiming that the predicate and ‘that’ form a semantic and 
syntactic unit with the predicate or perhaps that ‘that’ does not belong in the subordinate 
clause. I believe now that it is the first that is true. He would primary claim that what come 
last in PAAs is a sentence and not a singular term referring to a proposition. The reasons for 
his claims about parsing are partly determined by the fact that he can not support the 
traditional alternative. Perhaps they also rely on the assumption that what he experiences as 
problematic with the standard view can not be explained or amended to in a different way 
than changing the standard parsing of PAAs. This could possibly be a wrong assumption.22 
His theory also leads to some problematic entailments and so there is no easy choice of theory 
here. However this is an argument that is due later; now I want to see if it is possible to find 
some other reasons for his claims.  
 
 
A general fact that Prior seems to be convinced of is that the parsing and systematization of 
the structure of sentences is something that is open for discussion and not something that has 
been given a definite answer. The general reason here presented, that parsing is not something 
that is absolute, is something most philosophers would agree with. Claims about parsing are 
determined by more substantial claims and the substantial claims involve entailments about 
parsing. I would say that it is important to always explicate what supports the parsing and 
make this explicit knowledge to avoid untrue and or conflicting claims in theories. As said, 
Prior was aware of the many possibilities of parsing that this was connected to the 
fundamental logic of sentences, language, utterances etc. He gave examples of unorthodox 
ways of formatting sentences; like making a two place predicate of a conjunctive sentence 
‘Grass is green and sky is blue’. This can be formatted as a two place predicate ‘_is green 
and_ is blue’ (Prior 133). And this can be done regardless of this being a commonly used 
predicate or a relation that one would described e.g. the colour relation between green and 
blue. It is a relation one would not normally have a need to express and therefore it is not a 
commonly used predicate. But concerning his claims about propositional attitude ascriptions 
and indirect speech reports; he says that from the same example; ‘Grass is green and the sky is 
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 Philosophers that claim that that-clauses must have a content reading and not a object reading: King ? 
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blue’ there is possible to parse it with a noun, a sentence and a middle link that includes a 
connective which is ‘_is green and_’. And he thinks that this example is equivalent in form to 
what he takes as the correct parsing of PAA and ISR. He says: 
 
 …expressions like ‘_ fears that _’ and ‘_ thinks that _‘ have precisely this function of 
forming sentences from other expressions of which the first is a name and the second 
another sentence. They are as it were predicates at one end and connectives at the other. 
(Prior 19).  
 
The comparison between the constructed ‘_is green and_’ and attitude expressions is that they 
are a middle expression that takes a name and a sentence on each side and that is a composed 
unit made from a predicate and a connective. This parsing represents the real form of 
propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports according to Prior and that 
means that the supporters of the standard syntactic analysis have got the parsing wrong. 
Prior’s suggestion about how to parse propositional attitude ascriptions and these include 
syntactically; a) a name, b) an expression with a predicate and a connective on each side and 
c) a subordinate clause which is a sentence.  
But does he simply presented an alternative analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions or 
does he give some substantial reasons in support of his account, or at least reasons that go 
against the traditional parsing. If you remember, according to Ian Rumfitt Prior held that: 
“…the particle that" in (1) - the complementizer" in the linguists' argot - belongs semantically 
with the verb” (Rumfitt 430). Maybe these claims have some supporting reasons that supports 
Prior’s parsing. The two claims relevant in this context are that ‘that’ is a complementizer and 
that ‘that’ belongs semantically with the verb. First I will concentrate on the claim that the 
term ‘that’ is a complementizer. It seems as a correct statement for according to LinguaLinks 
Library a ‘complementizer’ is: “… a conjunction which marks a complement clause.” 
(http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAComplementizer.htm).  
Rumfitt claimed that ‘that’ functions as a complementizer in Priors theory and this seems 
apparently to be correct. There is only one trouble and that is that according to the statement 
form LinguaLinks it is true that complementizer is a conjunction. But is it a connective? This 
was what Rumfitt called the function of the term ‘that’ in his analysis.23 This argument 
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depends on the assumption that a connective is most reasonable a conjunction. Prior held that 
the expressions ‘_is green and_’ was syntactic comparable to for example ‘_believes that_’ 
and he believed that ‘that’ functioned as a connective. And it is reasonable to assume that if 
something functions like a connective it must imply that the term connects other terms and 
this is the ordinary function of conjunctions. According to LinguaLinks: “A conjunction is a 
word that syntactically links words or larger constituents, and expresses a semantic 
relationship between them.”  
(http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAConjunction.htm). 
I take it to be reasonable to assume that a conjunction was what Prior had in mind and that 
this then justifies the claim that he meant that ‘that’ was a complementizer. The only thing 
that makes this uncertain is that Prior had opportunity to call ‘that’ a conjunction like ‘and’ 
but he did not, he called it a connective. The uncertainty from this is not enough though to 
make me unwilling to assume that ‘that’ functions as a conjunctive and state that Rumfitt is 
right in his claim since a complementizer is a conjunction. The other claim; that Prior 
maintain that ‘that’ belongs semantically with the verb was more difficult finding arguments 
in support of. Prior theory at least amount to a competing account on how to parse 
propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports, but it has not been mentioned 
any substantial pro reasons for why the term ‘that’ and the predicate in these sentences should 
be taken a unit syntactically, or semantically. What has been established is that taking the 
predicate and ‘that’ as a syntactic unit is a workable possibility. Then perhaps Rumfitt 
assumed that because Prior claim that they belong together syntactically therefore ipso facto it 
meant that they make up a semantic unit? The claim that the predicate and ‘that’ belong 
together semantically does not seem true according to some of Priors other claims. He says 
about the middle expression in propositional attitude ascriptions, like for example ‘believes 
that’ and ‘thinks that’, that “…they are as it were predicates at one end and connectives at the 
other.” (Prior 19).  He claims that this expression is composed from a term functioning as a 
predicate and a term functioning as a connective. This combination is not naturally perceived 
as forming a semantic unit. He does not explain the function of them as a semantic unit. It 
seems that the two terms in these sentences could function just as well as independent units, 
because one of them is a conjunction and the other a verb and independent terms. What kind 
of reference they could make as a single unit. They seem as two singular syntactic and 
semantic units and combining them seems arbitrary and unreasonable. One could claim that 
they are a semantic unit but it would be strange if one would treat them as two single 
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independent units. While the predicate and connective might be stipulated as forming a 
syntactic unit semantically, it seems as they operate separately in propositional attitude 
ascriptions as a connective and as a predicate. At least, there is no reason for taking them to 
function as a semantic unit in what has been presented until now. However, nothing is easy 
dismissed, and there is a possibility that an explanation of this compound expression as a 
semantic unit is correct according to some of Prior sayings about his theory. He says: 
 
The verb “believes” here ceases to be a term and becomes part of an operator “believes 
that”, or “believes [ ]”, which, applied to a sentence, produces a composite absolute 
general term whereof the sentence is counted an immediate constitution. This is 
precisely my own proposal: it is one of the two points in the philosophy of logic on 
which Quine seems to me dead right. 
     (Prior 20).  
 
He is paraphrasing Quine in the first part. He claims that he is in agreement with Quine in that 
verbs like ‘believe’ belong together with ‘that’ and becomes an operator in sentences. If  the 
predicate and connective expressions in his theory shall function as an operator this will be 
reasons for claiming that in the underlying logical form of PAAs the two terms; a verb and the 
term ‘that’ will function as a unit. Is this enough to claim that they are a semantic unit? This 
again brings focus to the differences between syntactic structure and logical structure and the 
connection between these associated concepts. This is interesting but not the subject here. I 
will have to look at Quine’s arguments to say something about the semantic unit of the verb 
and ‘that’. Quine’s motivation for this is that he wants to explain the Fregean problem about 
opaque contexts without adding something to the ontology of the world. He thinks that 
‘believes that’ is an operator that takes Fa as its content, where a is the person and F is a 
complex sentence. Quine main focuses is on the information being communicated or stated, 
because of this he thinks that a theory that tries to explain away the ambiguity or the puzzling 
aspect in these situations is portraying something wrong. He also thinks that the right way to 
view this is not to focus on attitude ascriptions as a special class with distinct problems, he 
says that it is not just attitudes ascription that easy falls into this structure, he would rather 
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label the problematic cases as cases where one have an opaque construction. The class of 
opaque contexts is a much wider class than that of attitude ascriptions. In an opaque 
construction one cannot supplement a singular term by a codesignative term or a coextensive 
term or a sentence with same truth value, without possibly changing the truth value of the 
entire sentence. He takes it that theories are not supposed to explain away the ambiguity of 
opaque contexts, this ambiguity is inert in our language and theories should try to describe it 
not resolve it. Prior says that Quine is right in treating the attitude predicate and the 
connective as a unit but he also has his one reasons for supporting an alternative analysis. I 
mentioned before that Prior supports sententialism and he rejects propositionalism; that means 
that he thinks the object of thought is a linguistic entities and not as propositions. I will claim 
that his main reasons for parsing propositional attitude ascriptions as he does is that he thinks 
that the subordinate clause is a sentence, and not that he thinks the attitude term and the term 
‘that’ makes a semantic unit. He thinks that the last syntactic unit is a sentence because he is 
unwilling to accept some of the consequences of the standard analysis and structure-
propositionalism. The problem with the standard syntactic analysis, and the implicit 
structured-propositionalism, as he sees it is that their claims entail something wrong. It is the 
unintuitive and apparent wrong claim that we as persons stand in a direct relation to 
propositions. What one normally would accept is that we as thinking persons stand in relation 
to an object of thought as content etc. But since propositionalism and the standard analysis 
claim that the object of thought is a proposition and that that-clauses are singular terms this 
entails that the relation is between us and the actual proposition and not the content of the 
proposition.  
 
He thought that the consequences of this parsing were unintuitive and that people would not 
accept that they stood in relations to propositions when they had attitudes about things. If the 
traditional parsing was correct then it would be correct to describe someone as fearing 
propositions, knowing propositions, thinking propositions etc. and this would be the norm. 
But it is not and people don’t believe they are related to propositions. This problematic 
entailment is according to Prior a direct consequence of the standards syntactic analysis claim. 
The standard syntactic analysis claim that what comes after the predicate in propositional 
attitude ascriptions is a singular term, or something that functions as a name of a proposition. 
That means that standard syntactic analysis claims that there are two names and that the two-
place predicate expresses a relation between the objects designated by the names (Prior 17). 
 49 
The objects designated by the names in these contexts are persons and propositions, and that 
implies that the relation PAAs are describing is the relation between the person and the 
proposition, thus implying that persons are related to proposition in the way described by the 
predicate. This apposed to describing a relation between the person and a content of a 
proposition or a sentence or the state of affair etc. This entailment from the standard syntactic 
analysis created from holding the subordinate clause as a singular term like a name is 
unintuitive and treating the that-clause as a syntactic unit referring to propositions is therefore 
wrong. That is why his theory entails the ‘elimination’ of the subordinate clause as a name 
referring to a proposition. His suggestion is that the relation described by the predicate is a 
relation between a person and a linguistic entity. In his theory is the linguistic entity a 
sentence. He is not to content with this suggestion either. He says:  
 
We do not fear, hope, desire, or think sentences – we must stick fast to that….Nevertheless, if 
we are to bring out the difference between what X thinks when X thinks that there will be a 
nuclear war, and what X breaks when he breaks his leg – the difference, if you like, between 
‘objects of thought’, in sense (1), and ‘objects of breaking’ – we do have to talk about 
sentences, we do have to engage in ‘linguistic analysis’.  
(Prior 17).  
 
Sentences when seen as the object of attitudes can have the same problem as propositions. 
Prior mentions this in the beginning of the chapter, he says, among other things: “ It is at all 
events clear as regards thinking that even if we do always think in sentences, we do not think 
sentences (Prior 14). This is a problem if they are taken as referring to an object, or being an 
object, but then again sentences are not singular terms as that-clauses are supposed to be and 
then there is not an entailment saying that we as persons stand in an attitude relation to the 
object designated by the singular term in propositional attitude ascriptions. Prior thinks that 
his theory and his parsing will be a way to dispense of ‘propositions’ in belief contexts and 
that this is the reasons for presented an alternative parsing and an alternative syntactic 
analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions (Prior 20). The supporters of structured-
propositionalism and standard syntactic analysis might think that the unintuitive entailment is 
a small price to pay for the possibilities opened by the construction of propositions. But they 
cannot deny the fact that their claims and analysis entail the claim that people stand in relation 
to propositions, and that this is a divergence from the explanation or description that the 
persons themselves would give of their situation. However, as Prior agrees with Quine, he 
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agrees with the claim of sententialism and it entails that the relation expressed in propositional 
attitude ascription is a relation between a person and a linguistic entity. Prior claimed that the 
subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions was a sentence and so he thought that 
the linguistic entity was a sentence. But this explanation has some weaknesses that are 
perhaps just as unintuitive as the one entailed by the standard syntactic analysis. Sententialism 
can explain how people from different languages can think the same thing, but not in the 
direct fashion propositionalism can explain this. If John believe that snow is white, and I 
believe that ‘snø er hvitt’ then sententialism has no theory internal claim or assumption that 
make it possible to explain that we are thinking about the same thing. This is one problematic 
aspect, another is that there are situations where we would want to claim that animals have an 
object of thought, and then we would have to say that the animals stood in a relation to a 
sentence or another linguistic entity. This is wrong in the sense that animals do not have 
language, and supposedly they do not think in structured sentences, but sententialism have no 
way of appealing to anything else than sentences or linguistic entities as object of thoughts. It 
seems like a ethnocentric view on objects of thought. I think that Priors reasons for parsing 
are good, but perhaps not good enough when contrasting them to the imperfections of his own 
view.   
 
 
 
3.2 Davidson’s Paratactic Theory   
 
I am still looking at some alternative theories and accounts on how to syntactically parse 
propositional attitude ascription sentences and indirect speech report sentences. One 
alternative theory is developed by Donald Davidson. He presented a theory called the 
Paratactic theory. This theory entails claims that are in conflict with the claims of standard 
syntactic analysis and especially relevant for this paper are the claims about how to analyse 
indirect speech reports and propositional attitude ascriptions. In the article ‘On Saying That’ 
Donald Davidson concerns himself with what he describes as the logical form of indirect 
speech reports. Davidson thinks that ‘logical form’ stand for any sentence internal structures 
contribution to truth conditions and also the logical entailments or inferences possible of 
sentences. I will assume that his first notion of logical form is the same as the notion of 
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syntactic parsing. There are differences between these concepts but they share the important 
features necessary for treating them as approximately the same in this paper. The problem 
with Davidson’s concept of logical form is that he defines it directly to a Tarskian theory of 
truth.24 His claims on the logical form of indirect speech reports is just a small part in his 
language philosophy in which he is influenced by Alfred Tarskis philosophy and which is 
dominated by a Tarskian theory of truth. That means that the notion ‘logical form’ is a theory 
specific notion and not a generally accessible and useful notion. It is it defined directly in 
connection to a Tarskian truth theory. Nevertheless it is connected to claims in which more 
people than Davidson agrees. Davidson says that it is the structured contribution from 
combining the elements and the elements in them selves in sentences that make the logical 
form of sentences.25 This is the same presumptions of those who are concerned with a 
philosophical view on syntactic parsing, so there is no problem taking syntactic parsing and 
logical form as dealing with the same object and to have many of the same assumptions. This 
is very Davidsonian as he claimed that descriptions of objects may differ but that this does not 
suggest that one is not trying to describe or explain the same objects. Worth noticing; this 
does not mean he presents a sceptical view, he would say that there are descriptions that are 
true and descriptions that are not.  I believe that syntactic parsing, logical form and even 
grammatical form can be categorised as concepts belonging in the same subject family. 
Syntactic parsing, logical form and the grammar of sentences aims at describing systems that 
are coherent and logical and that reflects some fundamental truths, or connects to fundamental 
truths, not by making statements which are coherent with other known truths, but by dealing 
somewhat with ontology and metaphysic, and besides virtues as coherence: it suffices to be 
easy understood systems of formatting and order of language.26 It seems as logical form is the 
level of analysing sentences that is closest to ontological and metaphysical considerations, 
then syntactic parsing is sort of in a middle position between logical, metaphysical and 
ontological considerations on one side and the system of grammar and language on the other, 
and then grammar is the class most removed from ontology but perhaps it still bears some 
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 He says; “…the structure with which a sentence is endowed by a theory of truth in Tarski`s style deserves to 
be called the logical form of the sentence.” (Davidson 94). 
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 He says about an account of logical form; “…such an account must lead us to se the semantic character of the 
sentence – its truth and falsity – as owed to how it is composed, by a finite number of applications of some finite 
number of devices that suffice for language as a whole, out of elements drawn from a finite stock (the 
vocabulary)…” (Davidson 94).  
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 Grammar seems as the class that is most independent from ontological and fundamental logical considerations; 
it is maybe just derivative connected through it as a systems connection to the system of syntactic parsing and 
logical form. The relation between logical structure, grammatical structure and parsing would be an interesting 
topic. 
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features from these types of considerations. Then again the connection to a supposed 
universal logic could in fact be a connection to the structure and formation of consciousness, 
either if one takes it rationally-normative or as descriptive. This would be interesting to 
explore. But this is the beginning of an analysis of concepts, theories and systems and if one 
where to do an investigation at this level there assumedly would be many differences to find. 
This is not the topic for this paper and seeing ‘logical form’ and ‘syntactic parsing’ as 
notions’ belonging to different systems of explaining is not relevant for this.  
 
As I said before, the concept of logical form will be seen as approximately the same as 
syntactic parsing and this is justifiable related to context of this paper. The reason for this is 
that they aim to describe the same object; which I loosely would describe as the underlying 
structure of sentences and their ontological and theory implications. A philosophical view of 
syntax will have to relate it selves to considerations beside those of the languages inner rules 
and so considerations like these are similar to trying to find the logical structure in sentences. 
The different notions do this in different conceptual frameworks. However, as mentioned, it is 
only one of the conceptions of logical form that Davidson mentions that can be taken to 
describing the same subject as syntactic parsing. As said he gives two different notions and 
the notion excluded is that of ‘logical form’ as sentences logical inferences, this is not the 
same as syntactic parsing but connected to it in a derivative way. But now I want to resume 
the explication of the paratactic theory. Davidson meant that the logical form of sentences is 
the structure and elements that determines truth conditions. Davidson says that: “… by 
discovering an articulate structure that permits us to treat each sentence as composed of a 
finite number of devices that make a stated contribution to its truth conditions.” (Davidson 
96). The articulated structure is the explication of structure and parts that contribute to the 
truth condition of sentences and these two determine the logical form of sentences. This 
means, when we see this together with his other statements, that he thinks there are systematic 
contribution coming directly from the form and rules of compositionality that makes 
contributes to the truth condition of sentences or utterances and that there are combined 
elements of a finite stock. After this he says: “As soon as we assign familiar structure, 
however, we must allow the consequence of that assignment to flow, and these, as we know, 
are in the case of indirect discourse consequences we refuse to buy.” (Davidson 96). He thinks 
that we wrongly construe indirect speech reports as having a familiar structure. He is talking 
about indirect speech reports and our presupposing opinion that indirect speech reports have a 
familiar structure. The familiar structure is the standard syntactic analysis structure of these 
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sentences. He says that the belief in familiar structure is what consequently leads to the 
famous Fregean puzzle, in that there are consequences we refuse to accept, or as he say refuse 
to buy.  
 
In the analysis of what is wrong in indirect discourse he says that the familiar structure of 
indirect speech reports makes us want to treat the content part of ISR as if it contribute 
semantically in a normal fashion and we therefore treat the sentence as if it has familiar 
logical consequences. However this is not possible for our intuition suggest that the content 
part of ISR is semantically inert precisely because the familiar logical entailment does not 
intuitively seem to hold. It seems impossible to hold the familiar logical entailments meaning 
that that we can not exchange nouns that refer to the same objects in attitude contexts because 
this is unintuitive (Davidson 96). This is seen when our intuition tells us not to accept that 
John knows that Samuel Clemens is his favourite author even if he thinks Mark Twain is his 
favourite author for as a matter of fact John does not know that Mark Twain is Samuel 
Clemens. When he speaks about familiar structure what I take him to mean is the standard or 
current syntactic attitude towards sentences structure. In the case of indirect speech report is 
for example ‘He said that John was a man’ equivalent in form to ‘I broke my leg’. There are 
two objects that stand in a relation and both terms are a name of something.27 He thinks that 
taking indirect speech reports as having a familiar form gives a wrong analysis of the logical 
form and that he in fact has found the actual logical form. The logical form he presents can 
appear surface similar to the familiar form or the standard form, but there is difference in what 
is being referred to and there are also differences in structure even if it is not so apparent in 
his revised logical form. He thinks that the logical form of indirect speech reports sentences is 
shown if they are presented like;  
 
(1) The earth moves. Galileo said that.  
 
But according to him it makes sense to switch the two expressions, thereby making the hearer 
understand faster and more efficiently that this is an indirect speech report and not something 
else. This is important because the sentence that expresses the talkers interpretation of what 
was originally said (‘the earth moves’) is nonassertoric. It would not be conceived as non-
claimed it was first uttered or written. It seems efficiently and smart to change the order to 
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 The same understanding of the standard syntactic analysis of PAAs that Prior presents. The example ‘I broke 
my leg’ is taken from A.N Prior (Prior 17).   
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avoid misunderstanding. So Davidson assert that the right way to present the logical form of 
ISR (indirect speech reports) is like:  
 
(2) Galileo said that. The earth moves. 
 
In the standard syntactic analysis of indirect speech reports is it just one sentence and not two 
like in this theory. According to Davidson the assumed familiar form does not reflect the 
actual logical form of ISRs though he welcomes a familiar reading of the form of the same 
saying utterance, e.g. the last sentence in (2) (Davidson 108). Traditionally, indirect speech 
reports are analysed as sentences describing a saying relation between a person and a content 
of saying. It is not the exactly the same but equivalent in syntactic structure to the traditional 
way to analyse PAAs with a person, an attitude relation and content. There are philosophers 
that have converted and made a revised edition of Davidson’s paratactic theory so that it 
applies to propositional attitude ascriptions.28 According to the paratactic theory the 
traditional ISR analyse gives a partly correct presentation of the logical form; what is correct 
is that there is a person, a saying relation and a singular term. But according to Davidson this 
is true of only the first sentence in theory (e.g. Galileo said that) and in this utterance or 
sentence the singular term is the demonstrative term ‘that’. In the standard syntactic analysis 
the singular term was the that-clause. In the paratactic theory the term ‘that’ refers to a 
utterance and not a proposition, however they both agree that there is a singular term after the 
predicate in ISR. Davidson says regarding the term ‘that’ in indirect speech reports “…the 
‘that’ is a demonstrative singular term referring to an utterance (not a sentence).” (Davidson 
105). Davidson takes there to be good reasons for taking ‘that’ as a demonstrative in ISR. He 
says: 
 
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, The use of that is generally said to have 
arisen out of the demonstrative pronoun pointing to the clause which it introduces Cf. 
(1) He once lived here: we all know that; (2) That (now this) we all know: he ones lived 
here… 
(Davidson106).  
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 Ernest Lepore and Barry Loewer.  
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The Oxford English Dictionary claims that the term ‘that’ have originated in language as a 
demonstrative pointing to the clause it which it introduces. This is the same function of the 
term ‘that’ as understood by the paratactic theory. This will then be support for the paratactic 
theory as it makes it reasonable to take the term ‘that’ as primary as a demonstrative. 
However, this does not mean that the term ‘that’ must be a demonstrative. According to the 
paratactic theory the term ‘that’ do not refer to propositions it refers to the same-saying or the 
utterance that follows in the next sentence. 
 
The paratactic theory differs from the standard theory in that it claims that indirect speech 
reports consist logically of two combined but still independent claims, and that these two 
sentences (or utterances) have separate claims. The paratactic theory claims that one has to se 
what is communicated as something combined out of two sentences and two claims and in 
this way can the problems of indirect speech reports and propositional attitude ascriptions be 
resolved. Davidson says: “ Since an utterance of ‘Galileo said that’ and any utterance 
following it are semantically independent, there is no reason to predict, on grounds of form 
alone, any particular effect on the truth of the first from change in the second.” (Davidson 
107-108). The claim that someone said something and the claim of what one takes that person 
to have said at some time are in this sense independent. And so the problem of exchanging co-
referring names in the second sentence is unproblematic – because either is what is uttered a 
same saying of what was ones uttered or it is not, and this can account for the implausible 
conclusion that we do not want to accept. There is not a special problem with these sentences 
as it was when what was claimed was taken as a single sentence. The truth of the first 
utterance or sentence depend on if the following utterance is a same-saying of what ones said, 
but the same-saying can supposedly say the same things in different ways without the whole 
thing collapsing. It is an important point that the same-saying is not the actual utterance that 
was uttered. Davidson says that he prefers the first sentence to be described as a performative 
because it serves the role of introducing the next utterance. He thinks that it is like saying 
‘This is a joke’ where ‘this’ refers to the joke to come, analogous to ‘that’ referring to the 
utterance to come (Davidson 106-107). Actually he thinks one should take the two 
independent expressions in indirect speech reports not as sentences at all but as utterances; an 
utterance of a same-saying and a performative. This he holds because of his Tarskian truth 
theory. He says that he thinks that a theory of truth must apply to utterances as long as 
language contains demonstratives (Davidson 106). Perhaps demonstratives make it impossible 
to construct a truth theory of sentences as they can function well as a demonstrative in 
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utterances said in a context but without for filling the criteria for reference in sentences. I do 
not have a theoretical commitment to a truth theory like Davidson have and I have therefore 
mentioned both sentences and utterances.  
 
I said that it was important to se that the utterance following the performative is not the same 
utterance that ones were uttered by the person in question. Why this is so is clearly seen in the 
example given in example (2). It is clear that ‘The earth moves’ cannot be the actual utterance 
once uttered by Galileo because he spoke another language than English.29 But for the 
utterances of (2) to be true then the utterance ‘The earth moves’ it must be an utterance that is 
a same-saying of the utterance ones uttered by Galileo. The same-saying relation has proven 
to be difficult to explain, but according to Davidson if one can make radical interpretation a 
viable theory it will provide a concept of synonymy between utterances. This will then also be 
a possible explanation of some of the implausible entailments of Priors theory. Both Davidson 
and Prior are supporters of sententialism and a problem is that of unifying and explaining how 
one can express the same with two sentences in two different languages. This shows how 
integrated Davidson’s claims are and what a complete language theory he presents. He has 
constructed a system that one can compare to a card house; just a few cards can be removed 
without taking it all down, and it all builds on each other.  Following this analogy I would say 
that the paratactic theory is a card that can be removed without taking the card house down. 
But what it does is that it explains the Fregean puzzle, and I believe that is also the intention 
behind this alternative parsing. It makes the sententialism account seem more apt for 
explaining anomalies we don’t appreciate. It is supposed to give another explanation of the 
Fregean puzzle than the standard syntactic analysis, because the standard syntactic analyses 
presuppose the existence of propositions.  
 
The paratactic theory is a type of sententialism and sententialism is a theory that conflict with 
propositionalism, which is a part of the standard syntactic analysis. Sententialism claims that 
the object of thought is a type of linguistic entity. In Davidson’s theory the linguistic entity is 
utterances. Davidson’s main reason for presenting an alternative parsing of ISR is that he 
rejects the existence of propositions either as abstract, theoretical or ontological. He does not 
say that the predicate and ‘that’ form a semantic or syntactic unit or claim that ‘that’ not 
belonging in the subordinate place of propositional attitude ascriptions or indirect speech 
                                                 
29
 And because utterances, are token objects defined form persons and time of utterance. It can be defined with 
different criteria, but these are common. 
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reports. This is the type of argumentation that has been focused on in this paper. My attempt 
is to see if there are problems with the entailments of the parsing and related claims that 
would go against the standard way to parse PAAs and ISR. Davidson believes that his 
paratactic theory present the correct logical structure of indirect speech reports, but he present 
it as an alternative and competing account. His reasons not to accept the standard analysis is 
supported by more fundamental and wide-ranging disagreements. He does not accept the 
existence of propositions and thereby he does not accept the parsing that entails propositions. 
I believe that his reason for presenting another parsing is to weaken the arguments supporting 
structured-propositionalism and any theories claiming the existence of propositions. The 
problems in attitude contexts have been taken to support this existence and this is way he has 
presented another way to accommodate these problems. The differences between standard 
syntactic analysis and the paratactic account steams form the fact that propositionalism taken 
as a commitment to claiming that propositions exist and Davidson’s own truth theory are 
competing theories. The claim on parsing is simply a consequence of this. Davidson’s truth 
theory is supposed to explain the same things as a concept of propositions explain and this is 
not primarily to explain the problems revolving the substitution principle in attitude contexts 
but the explanation and justifying of aspects revolving the application and use of the concept 
‘truth’. Having the concept of proposition is useful, it refers to something that is mind and 
language independent, and which serves as something fundamental and universal; this will 
then be used when one want to explain that there is something in the world that justifies the 
criteria of truth.  
  
 
Propositionalism makes the concept of truth metaphysical while Davidson makes the concept 
of truth fundamental. I want to avoid these types of discussions. But propositionalism claims 
that propositions are true and this is what makes sentences that express propositions true. 
Davidson gives a competing account of how to explain truth. This is a theory in which truth 
and meaning is integrated, and an explanation using the concept of proposition is redundant. 
This is not the level of argumentation I have chosen for this paper, and so it is enough to 
mention these reasons. I will not explain them any further. I concentrate on the implications of 
his theory’s parsing and what it contributes to the subject.  
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He mentions that his theory claims that the term ‘that’ is functioning as a demonstrative in 
ISR, and that this is supported by the fact that ‘that’ originally was meant as a term that 
pointed to the following clause. This is a kind of reasoning that I would be interested in. He 
appeals to the common semantic of the word to speak for the fact that his theory is right. But 
as I mentioned, this fact is support for his views and it is not conclusive. However I do find 
his parsing of indirect speech reports both workable and plausible. There has been some critic 
of this theory on logical form. It has been mentioned that this analysis is too dependent on 
language specific conditions. It is not all languages that have the term ‘that’ in these types of 
sentences. Another critic is an effect of taking ‘that’ as referring to different non- repeatable 
utterances (same-sayings) makes ‘that’ in these utterances: ‘John said that. The earth is 
round.’ and ‘John said that. The earth is round.’ refers to two different utterances. And the 
theory offers no internal claims that will justify us identifying ‘the earth is round’ with ‘the 
earth is round’. Of course ‘the earth is round’ is a same-saying of ‘the earth is round’ but there 
is nothing identifying these as more alike than other same-saying of ‘the earth is round’. This 
suggests that the paratactic proposal says and explains too little and we could perhaps hope 
for a theory that explains more precisely elements in indirect speech reports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Rumfitt’s Paratactic Theory 
 
Ian Rumfitt develops another version of the paratactic theory in which the reference of ‘that’ 
is a proposition and the same-saying is a token of a propositional act type. He thinks that 
Davidson’s claim that the term ‘that’ refers to an unrepeated individual utterance is 
problematic and should be revised (446). He suggests that an abstract entity a type is needed 
in the paratactic account to avoid some problematic entailments. I said that he thinks that the 
reference of ‘that’ is a propositions, he actually says: “…we may, I think, construe the “that” 
as denoting the proposition associated with the propositional act bound by u’: for short, the 
proposition bound by u’.” (449). It seems he is unsure on this point, or perhaps he dislikes 
having to state this because he thinks it is too crude. He revises the paratactic theory so that 
‘that’ no longer refers to a same-saying or a string-of-words utterance made by the speaker. 
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He says that what people utter is an utterance that must be interpreted as a LF-structure, which 
includes the grammatical structure of utterances, this opposed to an utterance as a string of 
words, and that these are token types of a propositional act that he stipulates as: “…the 
conditions for an utterance u to be a token of the propositional act bound by u’ is that u’ report 
u, i.e. u’Ru.” (440). His technical notion propositional act functions as link between 
utterances and propositions, as he cannot say that the reference of an speech episode is ipso 
facto a reference to a universal proposition. This is a too far step. But then again he is not 
content with claiming that the reference of ‘that’ is the propositional act bound by u’. He says 
that: “The denotation of the demonstrative ought, ex officio, to be the thing said…”, and that 
the thing said is not identical with the act done by saying (440). He would be more content if 
propositions were deemed as what was said, and he concludes that one can associate, or 
perhaps even identify, distinct propositions with distinct propositional acts. But does he then 
mean propositional acts as tokens are to be identified with propositions or does he mean 
propositional acts as types have a proposition which can be identified or at least associated 
with it?  I also have trouble finding out what is implies by “bound by”. He says: “…only one 
proposition is bound by any given utterance.” and this relation is different form “expressing” 
(Rumfitt 450). He says there is a one-to-one correspondence between propositions and 
propositional acts. But he does not seem content with a strong identity claim, and I wonder 
whether his theory propositional acts can be seen as being constitutive for the notion of 
propositions, as Schiffer would claim that the use of proposition constitutes it as a notion.  
 
 
He mentions that Davidson’s version has some problematic aspects; among other things that it 
is implausible that every instance of ‘that’ e.g. the complementizer is an instance of an 
equiform demonstrative pronoun (Rumfitt 433). He says: “…there is next to nothing in 
common grammatically between (on the one hand) a pronoun that combines with a common 
noun to form a noun-phrase which can then stand in various sentential positions, and (on the 
other hand) and a particle that takes a finite clause to produce an object for a verb like “say” 
or “believe” (433). He seem to think it is impossible to originate with a neutral view on what 
type of term ‘that’ is in indirect speech reports as he seems to assume that ‘that’ is a 
complementizer that needs to be transformed to a demonstrative pronoun for Davidson’s 
claims to be plausible. As Davidson claimed that in indirect speech reports the term ‘that’ is a 
demonstrative pronoun. In the beginning of the article Rumfitt says that he will take that-
clauses to be noun phrases and this would explain why he thinks it is natural to see ‘that’ 
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fundamentally as a complementizer in these sentences. I agree with his saying that it is 
implausible that a complementizer is a demonstrative. However, I do not think that Davidson 
need to show how the complementizer ‘that’ can be transformed to or in some way double 
function as a demonstrative pronoun. It has been shown in this paper that that-clauses are not 
likely viewed as noun phrases. And therefore an account stating that ‘that’ is a 
complementizer is not a neutral ground for this debate. The view of ‘that’ as a 
complementizer is not a background claim for Davidson, even if it is a background claim for 
Rumfitt. Rumfitt thinks that one can convert the structure of indirect speech reports where 
‘that’ is a complementizer to a structure (LF-structure) where: “…the complementizing “that” 
gives way to a demonstrative pronoun which just happens, in English, to be equiform with it.” 
(Rumfitt 435). This LF-structure is also to play a prominent role in Rumfitts version of the 
paratactic theory. He says that the LF level is a description level of utterances where structural 
ambiguities are resolved, and therefore if ‘that’ is taken as referring to an LF –structure as 
apposed to common utterances, then indirect speech reports where there are ambiguities as to 
what was once originally said, can be explained. To give an example; in ‘John said that 
someone heard the shooting of the hunters’ is it claimed that the hunters were shoot or that 
there shooting on animals was heard? Rumfitt thinks that one can keep the reference of ‘that’ 
to an utterance but that this utterance is an utterance of a LF-tree structure (Rumfitt 437). This 
resolves the problems with determining what was originally said, because it accounts for a 
determinate original saying and that the same-saying in these cases must be same-saying of 
this original saying (tree structure) if it is to be true. Rumfitt says:  
 
…The paratactic proposal is no longer being defended as a thesis about that string [the 
string of (English) words that the reporter utters]; rather, it is being defended only as a 
conjecture about a structural description (more or less remote from surface form), under 
which the utterance receives its interpretation.  
(Rumfitt 439)  
 
The arguments supporting the transformation from ‘that’ as a complementizer to ‘that’ as a 
demonstrative pronoun is not explicated in the article by Rumfitt. But his figures show that he 
sees the that-clauses as a NP (noun phrase) where ‘that’ is a demonstrative pronoun referring 
to a unit that I suppose must be the same-saying which in Rumfitts terminology R-relates to a 
propositional act which in turn is connected to a proposition. I cannot see how a 
demonstrative pronoun referring to an utterance with an LF-structure, which in turn functions 
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with “deferred ostension” and is a token of a propositional type which is associated with a 
proposition, can be taken to be a noun phrase. It becomes meaningless labeling this as a noun 
phrase.30  
 
 
Matthew McGrath says something interesting about Rumfitts theory. He says: 
 
Standardly, defenders of the Relational Analysis take that-clauses to be syntactic units 
and take the attitude verbs to designate two place relations. However, strictly speaking, 
the analysis leaves open the possibility that that-clauses designate propositions by virtue 
of the combined workings of the complementizer ‘that’ and the sentence immediately 
following it. A case in point is the propositionalist version of Donald Davidson's 
)(1968) paratactic theory of indirect speech reports. On Davidson's theory, ‘Galileo said 
that the earth moves’ amounts to ‘Galileo said that. The earth moves’. Here ‘the earth 
moves’ functions as a separate displayed and nonassertoric utterance, and so does not 
combine with ‘that’ to form a syntactic unit. On the propositionalist version of this 
theory, ‘that’ refers not to the displayed utterance, but to the proposition designated by 
that utterance (Rumfitt (1993, p. 449). On such a view, through the combined workings 
of the ‘that’ and ‘the earth moves’, a proposition is designated. 
 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html) 
McGrath says that the that-clause designate with the complementizer and the sentence that 
follows it. This is apparently wrong for ‘that’ is either a complementizer e.g. a conjunction or 
a demonstrative pronoun. Rumfitts converts the complementizer to a demonstrative pronoun 
before making his claims, as he needs ‘that’ to be a demonstrative pronoun not a 
complementizer. Another question is if it is true that ‘that’ refers to a proposition in Rumfitts 
theory? Perhaps this will lead to problems when dealing with attitude ascriptions without the 
term ‘that’. In the original version of the paratactic theory the term ‘that’ simply denoted the 
utterance or string of-words following, one can say that ‘John believes that snow is white’ is 
the same as ‘John believes; snow is white’. If  the term ‘that’ in Rumfitt’s theory denote a 
proposition then attitude examples without ‘that’ will be harder to explain. I am unsure what 
to conclude ‘that’ refers to in Rumfitt’s theory. Is it a proposition or an utterance type or a LF-
                                                 
30
 For example: ”that. The water is cold”.   
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tree? Is it perhaps all of them? I would also be more content if Rumfitt had explicated his 
transformation of ‘that’ as a complementizer to ‘that’ as a demonstrative pronoun.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
 
What motivated me to choose an investigation of the term ‘that’ in that-clauses was the 
discrepancy between the statement of Abrahamsen and Bechtel and Williamson and Stanley. 
This made me question the need for the term ‘that’ in the subordinate clause in propositional 
attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports. It also made me wondering what support there 
was for treating the that-clause as a singular term. Williamson and Stanley relied on the 
standard syntactic when they argued for their views, and because of this it became important 
for me to investigate the claims of the standard syntactic analysis. Stephen Schiffer an 
advocate of the that-clause maintained that there where two important reasons to accept the 
that-clause as the last subordinate clause and as a singular term. The that-clause can function 
as a logical unit in logical arguments and this support it as having the property of being a 
singular term. The that-clause as singular term that refers to propositions is something that 
explains some problematic puzzles in philosophy of language, and one can say that without 
the possibility of treating the that-clause as a singular unit referring to something distinct the 
fregean puzzle would again be pressing. We saw that according to Quine this puzzle is not 
supposed to be resolved with theoretical assumptions and arguments.  
 
I thought that the account of the that-clause would be more plausible if what made up the that-
clause was established as a singular term before the introduction of the that-clause as referring 
to something as a unit. I would also prefer the account if one could show that that-clauses 
were a natural singular expression in natural language. I investigated to se if the that-clause 
was a singular term as a proper name or a complex noun phrase. I found that it was not 
plausible to se the that-clause as a noun phrase. It is also clamed that ‘that’ in that-clauses are  
complementizers and this was shown to be implausible, because either this would suggest that 
‘that’ is a independent syntactic unit or that ‘that’ is a marker for a clause and this account 
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would not support only stipulate that including ‘that’ in the last syntactic part is simply to 
separate it form sentences. Then there is the possibility of stating that the that-clause is a 
singular term because it functions as a singular term, and this is possible, but it makes the 
that-clauses property of being a singular term justifiable from the two main arguments and it 
in my opinion weakens the account of it as a singular term and as a part of natural language.  
 
The advocates and the opponents of the that-clause have substantial reasons in support of their 
account. Opponents like Donald Davidson want to avoid an account that need to stipulate 
something mind and language independent entity with the property of being true. The answer 
to where to parse ‘that’ in attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports rest fundamentally 
on the ontological views that support what expressions are to function as singular terms and 
what they refer too. Disagreements in this philosophical area lead to disagreement revolving 
the units in sentences. Then one should probably see the whole packaged when deciding upon 
which view to support.   
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